Trois essais en économie des ressources naturelles by Atewamba, Calvin
Université de Montréal
Trois Essais en Économie des Ressources Naturelles
par
Calvin Atewamba
Département de sciences économiques
Faculté des arts et des sciences
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des arts et des sciences
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Philosophiæ Doctor (Ph.D.)
en sciences économiques
14 Mai, 2012
c© Calvin Atewamba , 2012.
Université de Montréal
Faculté des arts et des sciences
Cette thèse intitulée:
Trois Essais en Économie des Ressources Naturelles
présentée par:
Calvin Atewamba
a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes:
Michel Poitevin, président-rapporteur
Gérard Gaudet, directeur de recherche
Benoit Perron, codirecteur
Marc Henry, membre du jury
Jean-Thomas Bernard, examinateur externe
Christopher Bryant, représentant du doyen de la FES
Thèse acceptée le: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Mai 2012
RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse est composée de trois articles en économie des ressources naturelles non-
renouvelables. Nous considérons tour à tour les questions suivantes : le prix in-situ des
ressources naturelles non-renouvelables ; le taux d’extraction optimal et le prix des res-
sources non-renouvelables et durables.
Dans le premier article, nous estimons le prix in-situ des ressources naturelles non-
renouvelables en utilisant les données sur le coût moyen d’extraction pour obtenir une
approximation du coût marginal. En utilisant la Méthode des Moments Généralisés, une
dynamique du prix de marché derivée des conditions d’optimalité du modèle d’Hotelling
est estimée avec des données de panel de 14 ressources naturelles non-renouvelables.
Nous trouvons des résultats qui tendent à soutenir le modèle. Premièrement, le modèle
d’Hotelling exhibe un bon pouvoir explicatif du prix de marché observé. Deuxièmement,
bien que le prix estimé présente un changement structurel dans le temps, ceci semble
n’avoir aucun impact significatif sur le pouvoir explicatif du modèle. Troisièmement, on
ne peut pas rejeter l’hypothèse que le coût marginal d’extraction puisse être approximé
par les données sur le coût moyen. Quatrièmement, le prix in-situ estimé en prenant en
compte les changements structurels décroît ou exhibe une forme en U inversé dans le
temps et semble être corrélé positivement avec le prix de marché. Cinquièmement, pour
neuf des quatorze ressources, la différence entre le prix in-situ estimé avec changements
structurels et celui estimé en négligeant les changements structurels est un processus de
moyenne nulle.
Dans le deuxième article, nous testons l’existence d’un équilibre dans lequel le taux
d’extraction optimal des ressources non-renouvelables est linéaire par rapport au stock
de ressource en terre. Tout d’abord, nous considérons un modèle d’Hotelling avec une
fonction de demande variant dans le temps caractérisée par une élasticité prix constante
et une fonction de coût d’extraction variant dans le temps caractérisée par des élasticités
constantes par rapport au taux d’extraction et au stock de ressource. Ensuite, nous mon-
trons qu’il existe un équilibre dans lequel le taux d’extraction optimal est proportionnel
au stock de ressource si et seulement si le taux d’actualisation et les paramètres des fonc-
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tions de demande et de coût d’extraction satisfont une relation bien précise. Enfin, nous
utilisons les données de panel de quatorze ressources non-renouvelables pour vérifier
empiriquement cette relation. Dans le cas où les paramètres du modèle sont supposés
invariants dans le temps, nous trouvons qu’on ne peut rejeter la relation que pour six des
quatorze ressources. Cependant, ce résultat change lorsque nous prenons en compte le
changement structurel dans le temps des prix des ressources. En fait, dans ce cas nous
trouvons que la relation est rejetée pour toutes les quatorze ressources.
Dans le troisième article, nous étudions l’évolution du prix d’une ressource naturelle
non-renouvelable dans le cas où cette ressource est durable, c’est-à-dire qu’une fois ex-
traite elle devient un actif productif détenu hors terre. On emprunte à la théorie de la
détermination du prix des actifs pour ce faire. Le choix de portefeuille porte alors sur les
actifs suivant : un stock de ressource non-renouvelable détenu en terre, qui ne procure
aucun service productif ; un stock de ressource détenu hors terre, qui procure un flux de
services productifs ; un stock d’un bien composite, qui peut être détenu soit sous forme
de capital productif, soit sous forme d’une obligation dont le rendement est donné. Les
productivités du secteur de production du bien composite et du secteur de l’extraction
de la ressource évoluent de façon stochastique. On montre que la prédiction que l’on
peut tirer quant au sentier de prix de la ressource diffère considérablement de celle qui
découle de la règle d’Hotelling élémentaire et qu’aucune prédiction non ambiguë quant
au comportement du sentier de prix ne peut être obtenue de façon analytique.
Mots clés: Ressources naturelles non renouvelables, Prix in-situ, Prix des ressources
naturelles, Modèle à changement d’état, Analyse MMG, Données de Panel, Res-
sources durables, Modèle inter-temporel d’évaluation d’actifs, MEDAF-C, Taux
d’extraction
ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three articles on the economics of nonrenewable natural re-
sources. We consider in turn the following questions : the in-situ price of nonrenewable
natural resources, the optimal extraction rate and the price of nonrenewable and durable
resources.
The purpose of the first article is to estimate the in-situ price of nonrenewable natural
resources using average extraction cost data as proxy for marginal cost. Using the regime
switching Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique, a dynamic of
the market price derived from the first-order conditions of a Hotelling model is estimated
with panel data for fourteen nonrenewable resources. I find results that tend to support
the model. First, it appears that the Hotelling model has a good explanatory power of the
observed market prices. Second, although the fitted prices seem to be subject to structural
breaks over time, this does not have a significant impact on the explanatory power of
the model. Third, there is evidence that marginal extraction cost can be approximated
by average extraction cost data. Fourth, when allowing for structural breaks, estimates
of the in-situ price decrease or exhibit an inverted U-shape over time and appear to
be positively correlated with the market price. Fifth, for nine of the fourteen minerals,
the difference between the estimates of the in-situ price with and without allowing for
structural breaks is a zero-mean process.
The second article tests whether an equilibrium under which the rates of extraction of
nonrenewable resources are linear in the stock of the resource is consistent with observed
data. I first show that with a time varying demand characterized by a constant price elas-
ticity and a time varying extraction cost function characterized by constant elasticities
with respect to the rate of extraction and to the remaining stock, there exists an equili-
brium in which the extraction rate is proportional to the stock of resource if and only if
the discount rate and the demand and cost parameters satisfy a very specific relationship.
I then use panel data on fourteen nonrenewable natural resources to test whether this
relationship is satisfied empirically. I find that if the parameters are assumed time inva-
riant, then for six of the fourteen resources I cannot reject the hypothesis. This changes
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however if I account for structural changes over time, in which case the hypothesis is
rejected for all fourteen resources.
In the last article, we take a capital asset pricing approach to the determination of the
price of a nonrenewable natural resource in the case where the resource is durable, in the
sense that once extracted it becomes a productive asset held above ground. The portfolio
choice is then made up of the following assets : a stock of nonrenewable resource held in
the ground that yields no dividend, a stock of resources held above ground that yields a
dividend in the form of a flow of productive services, and a stock of composite good that
can be held either in the form of productive capital or of a bond whose return is given.
There is a stochastic element to the rate of change of productivity in both the production
of the composite good and in the extraction of the resource. It is shown that the resulting
prediction for the price path of the resource differs considerably from the one that follows
from the more basic Hotelling model and that no unambiguous prediction can be drawn
analytically about the pattern of behavior of that price path.
Keywords : Nonrenewable natural resources, In-situ prices, Natural resource prices,
Switching model, GMM analysis, Panel data, Durable resources, Intertemporal as-
set pricing model, C-CAPM, Taux d’extraction
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INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE
La dépendance de l’économie mondiale des ressources naturelles non-renouvelables
est importante. Ces ressources naturelles, y compris les forêts, le pétrole, le charbon et
l’or, fournissent des services vitaux de base. Les combustibles à base des ressources na-
turelles non-renouvelables sont encore les principales sources d’énergie générée dans le
monde en raison de leur accessibilité et leur grand contenu énergétique. Malheureuse-
ment, leur utilisation n’est pas soutenable en raison du fait que ces ressources existent
souvent en quantité limitée, ou sont consommées beaucoup plus rapidement que la na-
ture ne peut assumer le renouvellement nécessaire. Dans la plupart des cas, une hausse
non anticipée du prix des ressources naturelles non-renouvelables pourrait endommager
certaines activités économiques et poser de nombreux préjudices. Les chocs énergiques
ont été, le plus souvent, des signes précurseurs des récessions économiques (par exemple
les chocs pétroliers des années 1970 et 2008). Chaque fois, les mêmes préoccupations
majeures émergent : Comment améliorer la gestion des ressources naturelles ? Comment
se forme le prix de ces ressources ?
Hotelling (1931) a proposé un cadre formel d’analyse de l’impact de la disponibilité
limitée des ressources naturelles non-renouvelables sur l’évolution de leur prix et taux
d’extraction. Cet auteur a montré que pour une entreprise minière cherchant à maxi-
miser la valeur actualisée des flux de bénéfices nets provenant de l’extraction, sous la
contrainte que le stock de la ressource s’épuise avec sa décision d’extraction actuelle, la
valeur marginale du stock de ressource en terre, appellée également le prix in-situ, de-
vrait croître au taux d’intérêt. Cet énoncé, qui est au cœur du développement théorique
de l’économie des ressources naturelles non-renouvelables, est souvent désigné comme
la règle d’Hotelling de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles non-renouvelables. Ce
modèle de base a été l’objet de nombreuses analyses théoriques du comportement des
marchés des ressources naturelles. Il existe cependant très peu de preuves empiriques
soutenant le fait que le prix des ressources se comporte effectivement tel que prédit par
2Hotelling (1931). 1 Cela ne devrait pas être trop surprenant, puisque ce modèle parcimo-
nieux de base néglige un certain nombre de facteurs importants qui jouent également un
rôle déterminant dans la formation du prix des ressources naturelles. 2
Bien qu’il y ait une abondante contribution théorique au modèle d’Hotelling de l’ex-
ploitation des ressources naturelles non-renouvelables, les études empiriques sont plus
rares. À date, les chercheurs n’ont pas encore apporté une preuve empirique selon la-
quelle le comportement du prix in-situ serait un déterminant significatif de l’évolution
du prix des ressources naturelles, la plupart du temps parce que le prix in-situ n’est pas
observable. 3 Notons que, pour des cas particuliers où les données de marché du prix
in-situ ont été observées, le test de la règle d’Hotelling a conduit à des résultats plus ou
moins acceptables (Miller and Upton, 1985b,a; Livernois et al., 2006). Cependant, il est
difficile, voire impossible d’estimer le vrai prix in-situ.
Cette thèse dévelope une nouvelle approche pour l’évaluation du modèle d’Hotel-
ling. Cette approche consiste à construire des équations de la demande et des coûts d’ex-
traction et à les utiliser pour résoudre le modèle d’équilibre du marché des ressources
naturelles résultant d’une maximisation inter-temporelle des profits de l’extraction. Elle
est composée de trois articles, chacun constituant un chapitre différent de la thèse. Le
premier article propose une estimation du prix in-situ des ressources naturelles non-
renouvelables en utilisant les données sur le coût moyen d’extraction pour obtenir une
approximation du coût marginal. Le deuxième article teste empiriquement l’existence
d’un équilibre dans lequel le taux d’extraction optimal est linéaire par rapport au stock
de ressource en terre. Le troisième article adopte une approche inter-temporelle d’éva-
luation des actifs financiers pour déterminer le prix d’une ressource non-renouvelable et
durable.
Comme l’a souligné Livernois (2009), si la rente de rareté (prix du marché moins
le coût marginal d’extraction) est seulement un des nombreux facteurs qui influencent
1. Voir Slade and Thille (2009) et Livernois (2009) pour une revue de littérature sur des analyses
empiriques de la règle d’Hotelling.
2. Voir Krautkraemer (1998) et Gaudet (2007) pour une revue de littérature sur des extensions théo-
riques du modèle de base d’Hotelling.
3. Voir, parmi d’autres, Farrow (1985), Halvorsen and Smith (1991) et Young (1992).
3le comportement du prix des ressources naturelles, toutes sortes de trajectoire de ce
prix sont possibles. En d’autres termes, en plus d’être testée, une question importante
serait de déterminer si oui ou non la règle d’Hotelling peut être utilisée pour expliquer
empiriquement l’évolution du prix de marché des ressources. Plusieurs auteurs ont déjà
abordé cette question avec des résultats insatisfaisants (Livernois, 2009). Toutefois, un
point doit être souligné. L’approche communément utilisée par ces auteurs, consiste à
faire des hypothèses sur le comportement du coût marginal d’extraction et d’utiliser leurs
implications pour la règle d’Hotelling pour expliquer l’évolution du prix de marché des
ressources naturelles comme une série chronologique (Slade, 1982; Berck and Roberts,
1995; Lee et al., 2006). Bien que l’étude des propriétés des séries chronologiques du
prix de marché des ressources naturelles peut fournir des informations utiles sur la règle
d’Hotelling, certaines informations sont perdues en n’incluant pas de l’information sur
le prix in-situ et le coût marginal d’extraction dans les prévisions du prix de marché.
Mais, ces informations ne sont généralement pas disponibles parce que ni le prix in-
situ, ni le coût marginal d’extraction n’est observable. Par conséquent, si l’objectif est
de prédire l’évolution du prix de marché des ressources non-renouvelables à l’aide de la
règle d’Hotelling, il faut obtenir au préalable des approximations appropriées pour ces
deux variables. Young (1992) a essayé d’incorporer des informations sur le coût marginal
d’extraction en spécifiant et en testant une fonction de coût appropriée. Cependant, le
prix estimé explique au plus un pour-cent du prix de marché observé.
Même si le coût marginal n’est pas observable, le coût moyen l’est souvent, comme
le coût total divisé par la production. Le but du premier article est donc de construire
un cadre pour évaluer le modèle d’Hotelling et de prédire le comportement du prix des
ressources en utilisant le coût moyen d’extraction pour obtenir une approximation du
coût marginal. La méthodologie est simple. D’abord, nous supposons une forme fonc-
tionnelle pour le coût d’extraction avec progrès technologique et effet de stock, ce qui
nous permet de spécifier comment le coût moyen d’extraction peut être utilisé comme
une approximation du coût marginal. Deuxièmement, nous utilisons le comportement
théorique du prix in-situ pour estimer le prix du marché qui est cohérent avec le modèle
d’Hotelling. Enfin, nous dérivons une estimation du prix in-situ ex-post. En utilisant la
4Méthode des Moments Généralisés (MMG) avec changement de régime, nous estimons
une dynamique du prix de la ressource, derivée des conditions d’optimalité du modèle
d’Hotelling, à partir des données de panel de quatorze ressources non renouvelables. 4
Nous trouvons que le modèle d’Hotelling a un bon pouvoir explicatif. Le prix in-situ
estimé semble être corrélé positivement au prix de marché pour toutes les ressources
étudiées.
Bien que les résultats obtenus dans le premier article fournissent des informations
empiriques importantes sur le comportement du prix des ressources non-renouvelables,
il reste que le modèle empirique considéré ne nous permet pas de caractériser le taux
d’extraction optimal. Il existe très peu de littérature empirique sur le comportement du
taux d’extraction optimal, bien que les études théoriques, argumentent qu’il devrait dé-
croître dans le temps dû à l’épuisement du stock de ressource en terre. Certains auteurs
comme Lin and Wagner (2007) ont, pour des fins empiriques, supposé que le taux d’ex-
traction optimal est une fonction linéaire du stock de ressource en terre ou du stock
cumulé de la ressource extraite. Un taux d’extraction linéaire par rapport au stock de
ressource a l’avantage d’être simple et facile à manipuler analytiquement. Il reste, ce-
pendant, à fournir un test empirique de la valideté d’un tel équilibre. C’est le but prin-
cipal du deuxième article de cette thèse. Nous montrons, en utilisant les données de
panel de quatorze ressources non-renouvelables, qu’on ne peut rejeter l’hypothèse d’un
taux d’extraction linéaire par rapport au stock de ressource que pour six des ressources.
Cependant, en prenant en compte le changement structurel dans le temps du prix des
ressources, nous trouvons que cette hypothèse est rejetée pour chacune des quatorze
ressources.
De nombreuses implications du modèle de base d’Hotelling sont modifiées lorsque
des caractéristiques plus complexes et plus réalistes de l’exploitation des ressources non-
renouvelables sont prises en compte. 5 Parmi ces caractéristiques figurent l’incertitude
quant aux perspectives futures et le fait que de nombreuses ressources naturelles non-
4. Ces ressources sont le bauxite, le cuivre, l’or, le charbon, le fer, le plomb, le gaz naturel ainsi que le
nickel, le pétrole, le phosphate, le charbon brun, l’argent, l’étain et le zinc.
5. Voir Krautkraemer (1998) et Gaudet (2007) pour une importante littérature sur des extensions théo-
riques du modèle d’Hotelling de base
5renouvelables sont durables, contrairement à ce qui est le plus souvent supposé dans
la modélisation théorique. L’objectif du troisième article est d’explorer l’impact de la
prise en compte simultanée de ces deux facteurs sur l’évolution du prix d’équilibre des
ressources naturelles.
Il existe une vaste littérature sur la présence de l’incertitude, sous diverses formes,
dans les marchés des ressources naturelles. Ce troisième article suit étroitement la modé-
lisation stochastique des perspectives futures proposées dans Gaudet and Khadr (1991),
qui a étudié le cas des ressources naturelles non-durables. Ce qui distingue Gaudet and
Khadr (1991) des autres auteurs est qu’il prend une approche inter-temporelle d’évalua-
tion des actifs. 6 Ainsi, la règle d’Hotelling s’interprète comme une condition d’équilibre
du marché des actifs, l’actif étant bien sûr le stock de la ressource en terre. Cet actif,
contrairement aux actifs reproductibles tel que le capital physique conventionnel, a la
particularité qu’il ne peut être augmenté, avec pour résultat que les décisions de désin-
vestissement sont irréversibles. La question devient alors : quel est le taux de rendement
approprié pour détenir une unité de la ressource en terre ? Dans le cadre déterministe de
base proposé par Hotelling, la réponse est tout simplement le gain en capital qui peut
être obtenu en maintenant l’unité de la ressource en terre. Lorsque les opportunités d’in-
vestissement sont stochastiques, il est montré dans Gaudet and Khadr (1991) que son
rendement d’équilibre espéré dépendra également du degré d’aversion au risque et de la
façon dont son rendement est corrélé avec la performance de l’économie en termes de
consommation.
Les ressources non-renouvelables font le plus souvent penser aux combustibles fos-
siles, comme le pétrole, le gaz naturel ou le charbon. Bien que ces ressources naturelles
soient stockables, elles ne sont pas durables, car elles sont consommées entièrement en
une seule utilisation. Cependant, de nombreuses ressources non-renouvelables, telles que
les métaux, sont durables : 7 une fois extraites et détenues en surface, elles deviennent
6. Plusieurs auteurs ont introduit l’incertitude dans le modèle d’Hotelling . Entre autres, nous pou-
vons citer Gilbert (1979), Glenn (1978), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981), Pindyck (1980), Deshmukh and
Pliska (1980), Levhari and Pindyck (1981), Deshmukh and Pliska (1983), Lasserre (1984), and Gaudet
and Howitt (1989).
7. Entre autres, les ressources suivantes sont durables : l’or, le diamant, le bauxite, le cuivre, le fer, le
plomb, aussi bien que le nickel, l’argent, l’étain et le zinc.
6des actifs capables de donner un flux continu de services utilisés comme intrants dans
des processus de production différents. Nous sommes alors en présence de deux actifs
en ressources : un stock détenu en terre qui ne donne aucun flux de services et un stock
détenu en surface qui en donne. Ces actifs ont la particularité que celui détenu en surface
ne peut être augmenté qu’en réduisant celui détenu en terre. Levhari and Pindyck (1981)
est la référence la plus importante sur le comportement des marchés des ressources du-
rables, un thème sur lequel il existe, étonnamment, très peu de littérature malgré le fait
que beaucoup de ressources non-renouvelables soient en réalité durables. Il a considéré
la fixation du prix de ces ressources dans un contexte d’équilibre partiel.
Dans ce troisième article, nous combinons une approche similaire à celle de Lev-
hari and Pindyck (1981) pour la modélisation de la durabilité de la ressource avec le
cadre d’évaluation des ressources naturelles non-renouvelables de Gaudet and Khadr
(1991) à deux produits multi-actifs. Nos résultats montrent que l’on devrait faire preuve
de beaucoup de prudence lorsqu’on élabore des prédictions analytiques sur le compor-
tement du prix des ressources dans un tel contexte. Ils soulignent l’importance pour les
études empiriques sur le prix des ressources de prendre en compte l’incertitude quant aux
opportunités d’investissements futures, tout particulièrement dans le cas des ressources
durables.
CHAPITRE 1
ESTIMATES OF THE IN-SITU PRICE OF NON-RENEWABLE NATURAL
RESOURCES
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the in-situ price of nonrenewable natural re-
sources using average extraction cost data as proxy for marginal cost. Using the regime
switching Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique, a dynamic of
the market price obtained from the first-order conditions of a Hotelling model is esti-
mated with panel data for fourteen nonrenewable resources. I find results that tend to
support the model. First, it appears that the Hotelling model has a good explanatory po-
wer of the observed market prices. Second, although the fitted prices seem to be time
inconsistent, the time inconsistency does not have a significant impact on the explana-
tory power of the model. Third, there is evidence that marginal extraction cost can be
approximated by average extraction cost data. Fourth, the time consistent estimates of
the in-situ price decreases or exhibits an inverted U-shape over time and appear to be
positively correlated with the market price. Fifth, for nine of the fourteen minerals, the
difference between the time-consistent and the time-inconsistent estimates of the in-situ
price is a zero-mean process.
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to assess the Hotelling model, the core theory of nonre-
newable resource economics. The Hotelling model predicts that in the absence of stock
effects the in-situ price, which is equal to the market price less the marginal extraction
cost, should grow at the rate of interest, (Hotelling, 1931). This statement known as the
Hotelling rule has been tested with unsatisfactory results 1. In addition to being tested, an
1. See, among others, Farrow (1985), Halvorsen and Smith (1991) and Young (1992)
8important question is whether or not the Hotelling model can be used to explain empiri-
cally the evolution of non-renewable resource market prices. Many authors have already
addressed this issue with weak results (Livernois, 2009). However, one point has to be
underlined. The common approach used by those authors is to make assumptions on the
behaviour of the marginal extraction cost and use their implications for the Hotelling
rule to explain the evolution of the nonrenewable natural resource market price as time
series (Slade, 1982; Berck and Roberts, 1995; Lee et al., 2006). Although the proper-
ties of the time series on the market price of the resource provide useful information
about the implications of the Hotelling rule, some information is lost by not including
information about the in-situ price and the marginal extraction cost in predictions of the
market price. But this information is usually not available, because neither the in-situ
price nor the marginal extraction cost are observable. Therefore, if the goal is to predict
the evolution of the market price of a nonrenewable resource using Hotelling rule, it is
useful to first obtain suitable proxies for those two important variables. Young (1992)
did attempt to incorporate information about marginal extraction cost by specifying and
testing a suitable cost function. However, the estimated price explains at most 1 percent
of the observed market price.
Even though marginal cost is not observable, average cost often is, as the total cost
divided by the production. The aim of this paper is to build a framework to evaluate
the Hotelling model and predict the behaviour of nonrenewable resource prices using
average extraction cost to obtain a proxy for marginal extraction cost. The methodology
is straightforward : first, I assume a functional form for extraction cost which allows me
to specify how average extraction can be used as a proxy for marginal extraction cost ;
second, I use the theoretical behaviour of the in-situ price to estimate the market price
which is consistent with the Hotelling model ; finally, I derive an estimated in-situ price
ex-post. I find that the Hotelling model has a good explanatory power of the observed
market price.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I present the
9theoretical model of resource extraction. In particular, I assume an increasing average
extraction cost and focus on its impacts on the equilibrium price path. In Section 1.3, I
propose a methodology to estimate a reduce form of first-order conditions of the Hotel-
ling model. This empirical methodology is then used in Section 1.4 to analyse fourteen
natural resource market prices. I conclude in Section 1.5.
1.2 Theoretical model of the resource extraction
In this section, I present a theoretical model of the optimal nonrenewable resource
extraction in a competitive market. 2
1.2.1 The Basic Hotelling model of resource extraction
Consider a competitive firm extracting a known and finite stock of a non-renewable
resource. The firm chooses a time path of resource extraction to maximize the present
value of the stream of net benefits subject to the constraint that the cumulative extraction
be not greater than the initial resource endowment. The extraction cost, the principal
characteristic of the firm, is subject to technological progress, which causes the cost to
decrease, and to a stock effect, which causes the cost to increase.
The notation follows closely that used by Lin and Wagner (2007) and Krautkraemer
(1998). At time t ∈ [0,+∞], the supply of the mineral is given by q(t), the extraction flow
at time t. The cost of extracting q(t) at time t is denoted by C(z(t),q(t),S(t)), where S(t)
is the remaining stock of the resource at time t and z(t) is a productivity index indicating
the state of extraction technology. I assume that Cz < 0, Cs < 0, Css > 0 Cq > 0 and
Cqq > 0, where Cq denotes the partial derivative ∂C/∂q, etc. To simplify, I assume that
the average extraction cost is an increasing function of the extraction rate, that is :
2. Assuming competitive market is a simplification of the market structure of nonrenewable natural
resources. In principle, there may be a market power. Lin and Zhang (2011) found that countries supplying
hard coal, lead, and oil behaved as oligopolists during the period of study, while the market for other
nonrenewable resources could be characterized as perfectly competitive.
10
Cq(z,q,S)≥ C(z,q,S)q , ∀z,q,S. (1.1)
While making its extraction decision, the firm takes as given the market price p(t)
of the mineral. The optimal control problem it faces is to choose a time path of resource
extraction q(t) to maximize :
∫ +∞
0
e−δ t [p(t)q(t)−C(z(t),q(t),S(t))]dt, (1.2)
subject to
S˙(t) =−q(t), ∀t (1.3)
q(t)≥ 0, S(t)≥ 0 ∀t (1.4)
S(0) = S0 (1.5)
and where δ denotes the rate of discount.
Let λ (t) denote the co-state variable associated to the resource stock. The current
value Hamiltonian of the problem is then :
H(t,q(t),S(t),λ (t)) = p(t)q(t)−C(z(t),q(t),S(t))−λ (t)q(t), (1.6)
The static efficiency condition is :
∂H
∂q
= p−Cq(z,q,S)−λ = 0, (1.7)
where the time argument is implicit. Let λ˙ denote the time derivative of λ . The
dynamic efficiency condition is then given by :
λ˙ = δλ − ∂H
∂S
= δλ +Cs(z,q,S). (1.8)
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First-order conditions (1.7) and (1.8) of the Hotelling model state that, the in-situ
price λ corrected by the stock effect CS should grow at a constant rate. With this form,
the behaviour of the resource price cannot be estimated because the marginal cost Cq and
the stock effect Cs are not observable. However, the implications for the resource price
path can be derived under specific assumptions about the cost function. When margi-
nal extraction cost, Cq, is a constant or a decreasing function of time due to technology
progress, an increasing function of extraction rate and a decreasing function of resource
stock, one can find a U-shape price path,(Slade, 1982). This behaviour of the market
price has been testing unsuccessful, particularly because time series data for prices ex-
hibit stochastic trends (Berck and Roberts, 1995). In the next section, I propose an ap-
proach to obtain a useful dynamic of the market price from the optimal conditions (1.7)
and (1.8) which uses the average extraction cost as a proxy for marginal extraction cost.
1.2.2 Cost specification and the dynamic of the market price
To make the optimal conditions (1.7) and (1.8) of the Hotelling model empirically
tractable, I will assume the following extraction cost function, which is close to the one
used in Lin and Wagner (2007).
C(z,q,S) = c0e−γtqαS−b (1.9)
with a nonnegative productivity growth rate γ ≥ 0, stock elasticity b≥ 0 and constant
c0≥ 0. Technological progress causes cost to decrease and other things being equal a one
percent increase in technology causes costs to decrease by 1 percent. Costs rise as more
of the resource has been extracted and other things being equal a one percent decrease
in resource stock causes costs to increase by b percent.
With this functional form, marginal cost can be expressed as a function of the average
extraction cost.
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Cq(z,q,S) = α
C(z,q,S)
q
(1.10)
The parameter α appears as an adjustment coefficient between the average and mar-
ginal extraction costs. The elasticity of marginal extraction cost is given by :
ε(z,q,S) =
qCqq(z,q,S)
Cq(z,q,S)
= α−1, (1.11)
which must be nonnegative to guarantee that the supply curve will be non decreasing.
It will therefore be assumed that α ≥ 1. If α = 1, the average extraction cost is equal
to the marginal extraction cost. If α > 1, both marginal and average extraction costs
are increasing. The stock effect Cs is not observable, but, with the cost function (1.9), it
can be expressed as a function of observable variables. Denoting by X(t) the cumulative
resource extracted at time t, the stock effect can be written as follows :
Cs(z,q,S) =−b qS0−X
C(z,q,S)
q
. (1.12)
The function f (q,X) =−b qS0−X is an adjustment factor between the stock effect and
the average extraction cost. Note that, in the absence of the stock effect the parameter
b is zero and the adjustment factor f (q,X) is zero as well. Substituting from equations
(1.10) and (1.12) into the efficiency conditions (1.7) and (1.8), we get :
λ (t) = p(t)−αAC(t) (1.13)
λ˙ (t) = δλ (t)−b q(t)
S0−X(t)AC(t). (1.14)
As the observed data is in discontinuous time, it will be necessary to discretize the
above equations. The discrete form associated to equation (1.14) is given by :
λt+1−λt = δλt−b qt+1S0−Xt+1 ACt+1. (1.15)
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Substituting from equation (1.13) into equation (1.15) and rearranging, I obtain the
following expression of the market price :
pt = (1+δ )pt−1+αACt−α(1+δ )ACt−1−b qtS0−Xt ACt . (1.16)
In this form, the optimal conditions of the Hotelling model can be estimated to pre-
dict the behaviour of the market price, using average cost data as a proxy for marginal
cost. Note that, an estimation of the above equation provides the marginal extraction cost
elasticity α which can be used, ex post, to estimate the in-situ price given by the static
efficiency condition (1.13).
1.3 Empirical analysis of the Hotelling model
In this section, I develop an empirical model to estimate and evaluate the dynamic of
the market price derived from the Hotelling model’s optimal conditions obtained in the
previous section.
1.3.1 The data and the empirical model
I use the same data as in Lin and Wagner (2007). 3 This database is a compilation
of the data on several countries producing a nonrenewable natural resource. It contains
average annual world price, country’s average cost and country’s current stock data for
14 ores from previously unpublished World Bank data. The commodities are bauxite,
copper, gold, hard coal, iron, lead, natural gas as well as nickel, oil, phosphate, brown
coal, silver, tin. and zinc. The data cover 35 years from 1970 to 2004. The summary
statistics on the ores which are analysed in this empirical section are presented in the
Appendix. The market price is common to all countries, while the extraction costs are
particular to each country. The best way to account for the unspecified characteristics of
3. The database was downloaded directly from http ://gwagner.com/research/hotelling/, provided in
their paper by Lin and Wagner. It is described in detail in their Appendix B.
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each country on which those cost depend will be to introduce country effects, which are
captured by a constant term.
Assume that countries have the same evaluation of future cash flows and also the
same extraction technology. In other words, parameters δ , α , b and γ are free of country
effects. If future market prices are well anticipated by each country, it follows that coun-
tries choose different extraction path only because they have different resource stocks.
Therefore, the initial stock Si0 is an appropriate parameter to describe the country’s cha-
racteristics. I will use this initial stock to capture the country effects.
An estimate of the initial stocks, Si0, should satisfy the following condition :
Si0 ≥
Ti
∑
t=0
qit (1.17)
where Ti is the sample size. To guarantee that this condition is satisfied, I can decom-
pose the initial stock in two components :
Si0 = βi+
Ti
∑
t=0
qit , (1.18)
where βi ≥ 0 is a parameter which captures the last period stock. Now define the
following residual :
Rit =
Ti
∑
τ=0
qiτ −Xit =
Ti
∑
τ=t+1
qiτ . (1.19)
Substituting the above expression in (1.16), the empirical model to be estimated be-
comes :
pt = (1+δ )pt−1+αACit−α(1+δ )ACit−1−b qitβi+Rit ACit + εit , (1.20)
subject to the constraints
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b≥ 0; α ≥ 1; βi ≥ 0; δ ≥ 0, (1.21)
where εit is an error term which can be correlated within countries.
Since the discount rate δ is positive the empirical model exhibits a non stationary
trend for the market price. This trend can lead to spurious regressions. However, a close
look at the empirical model to be estimated shows that the market price trend is offset
in the right-hand side of the model. To see this clearly, rewrite the empirical model as
follows :
pt− pt−1 = δ (pt−1−αACit−1)+α(ACit−ACit−1)−b qitβi+Rit ACit + εit . (1.22)
In this form, the theoretical trend of the market price disappears and the error term
seems to be the sum of stationary components.
This alternative empirical formulation emphasizes the fact that the model can serve
to explain the variation in the market flow price by the lagged in-situ price (the first
term on the right-hand side), the variation in the average extraction cost (the second
term), and the marginal stock effect on costs (see equation (1.12)). The discount rate δ
is seen to capture the speed of adjustment of the market flow price to the value of the
lagged in-situ price given by pt−1−αACit−1, the difference between price and marginal
extraction cost. The parameter δ being restricted to nonnegative values, the in-situ price
has a nonnegative effect on the market flow price pt , and, everything else the same, the
adjustment will be faster the larger if δ .
The main goal is to get an estimate of the in-situ price, which is not observable. By
estimating equation (1.22) we obtain estimates of the parameters α and βi, which can
then be used to derive an estimate of the in-situ price λit . The in-situ price is in fact the
price of the asset held in the ground and we therefore want its estimate to take “almost
surely” nonnegative values. Since λit(α) = pt −αACit , this means that we must impose
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an upper bound α¯ on the parameter α for estimation purposes. For all values of the
market price pt and the average extraction cost ACit , it exists a real αit just that, for all
α > αit , we have λit(α)≤ 0. Let α¯ = In fit (αit). Then if α > α¯ , we have prob(λit(α)<
0|α ≥ α¯)> 0. The question remains as to how to determine the appropriate value of α¯ .
To characterize this upper bound on α , I will assume that :
prob(λit(α)< 0|α = α¯)≤ prob(λit(α)≥ 0|α = α¯). (1.23)
This says that when α is equal to its upper bound, the probability of obtaining a
nonnegative in-situ price is greater than the probability of obtaining a negative in-situ
price. Rewriting the above condition in terms of the stochastic variable pt/ACit , we get :
0 < prob
(
pt
ACit
< α¯
)
≤ prob
(
pt
ACit
≥ α¯
)
. (1.24)
Information about the distribution of pt/ACit will be helpful to fix an approriate upper
bound on α . The boundary condition (1.24) suggests that, in the probabilistic sense 4,
almost surely :
In f
(
pt
ACit
)
< α¯ ≤Median
(
pt
ACit
)
. (1.25)
Table 1.I summarizes some characteristics of the data on pt/ACit . It appears that the
mean is greater than the median for all ores. Therefore the stochastic variable pt/ACit is
asymmetric. As the median and the mean are closer to the minimum than the maximum,
the distribution of pt/ACit has a long right tail.
Notice that, from condition (1.25) and the properties of the distribution of pt/ACit ,
the lower bound α = 1 should result in a high probability of positive in-situ prices. This
is an interesting property, since α = 1 corresponds to the special case where marginal
extraction cost is equal to average extraction cost, and hence is independent of the ex-
traction rate. In such a case we have constant returns to scale and the data on average
4. We consider the probability that generates the data
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Tableau 1.I – Summary characteristics of the stochastic variable pt/ACit
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
Min 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
Max 86.10 5606.66 3.47 4.65 5.23 6.85 7.24 20.60 11.92 4.57 3.78 3.42 3.21 1.00
Mean 8.05 93.62 1.37 1.66 1.67 1.51 2.39 2.50 2.97 1.58 1.48 1.38 1.31 1.00
Median 4.26 2.24 1.20 1.44 1.39 1.25 1.87 1.88 2.38 1.41 1.34 1.39 1.25 1.00
Std 11.36 578.96 0.36 0.65 0.67 0.64 1.24 2.28 1.91 0.51 0.45 0.18 0.25 0.00
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; BAU, bauxite ; COP’ copper ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
extraction cost can be safely used to represent marginal extraction cost.
1.3.2 Market value of a unit of the resource in ground
Notice that the above empirical model generates a different estimate of λit for each
country, which follows the stochastic equation :
λit = (1+δ )λit−1−bqitACitSit + εit , with E(εit/Sit , pt , pt+1, ...) = 0, (1.26)
where εit is the same error term considered in the equation (1.20). But there is a single
market and hence a single in-situ price λt . The difference between the idiosyncratic λit
and the unique market λt can be assumed to satisfy the following stochastic equation :
λt−λit = uit , with E(uit/Sit , pt , pt+1, ...) = 0 ∀i, t, (1.27)
where uit is the error term which may be correlated among countries. This states
that the difference between λit and λt is due to the fact that country i has information
only about its own stock of the resource in the ground, Sit . As shown in the Appendix,
from the stochastic equations (1.26) and (1.27) it follows that the real value of a unit of
resource in the ground and its dynamics can be expressed as :
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λt = pt−α
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 SitACit
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 Sit
(1.28)
λt = (1+δ )λt−1−b
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 qitACit
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 Sit
. (1.29)
An interpretation is that when there are many producers in a mineral market, the
value of a unit of the resource in ground is an aggregation of the information about
this value over all countries. It follows that in a resource market with m competitive
producers, the estimate of the market in-situ price is given by :
λt = pt−α
m
∑
i=1
Sit
∑mk=1 Skt
ACit . (1.30)
1.3.3 Regime Switching Nonlinear GMM estimation
The empirical model developed in this paper is nonlinear in b, α , δ and βi. The
method of estimation depends on the nature of the explanatory variables and the fur-
ther assumptions made on the behaviour of the error terms. In the simplest case, if the
explanatory variables are exogenous and the error term follows a normal distribution,
an appropriate estimation method is the Maximum Likelihood. The Maximum Likeli-
hood Estimator has important properties of efficiency, but its well known limitation is
the normality assumption of the error terms. The more general and frequently used ap-
proach is to assume that the behaviour of the error terms is unknown. In that situation, if
the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, a convenient estimation method is the
Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) method. But the average extraction cost is a function of
the extraction rate, which is an endogenous variable. Furthermore, the residual stock Rit
is a function of the future resource extraction rates. Therefore it will be appropriate to
treat the average extraction cost and the residual stocks as endogenous variables. This
implies that the NLS method may no longer be an appropriate estimation method. It is
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important to take into account this endogeneity property to obtain a consistent estimator
of the parameters. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which includes the
NLS as a special case, provides a solution (see Matyas (1999)). Note that, the GMM
estimator is a M.estimator, which is asymptotically normal under no restriction on the
distribution of the error terms. I will now discuss the way to use this estimation method
to fit the dynamic of the market price (1.22) derived from the Hotelling model’s optimal
conditions.
1.3.3.1 The GMM estimator
Denote the parameters to be estimated by θ = (b,α,δ ,β1, ...,βn) ∈Θ and the obser-
vable variables by yit = (pt ,ACit ,ACit−1,qit ,Rit) , and let θ0 ∈ Θ be the true parameter
value. Assume
f (yit ;θ0) = εit , E(εit/Sit , pt , pt+1, ...) = 0, θ0 ∈Θ, (1.31)
where f (yit ;θ) = pt−(1+δ )pt−1−αACit +α(1+δ )ACit−1+b qitβi+Rit ACit is the ele-
mentary function, or the residual. Grouping all these residuals in a T ×1 vector f (y;θ),
I assume :
E
[
f (y;θ0)′ f (y;θ0)
]
=Ω, θ0 ∈Θ, (1.32)
where Ω is a positive definite matrix, assumed to be unknown and T = ∑Tii=1.
Now denote by wit the instrumental variable for country i. Assuming that variables
ACit−1, qit−1 and Xit−1 are predetermined 5 for all countries, the instrumental variable
wit is constituted with variables (ACit−1,qit−1,Xit−1) and (AC jt−1,q jt−1,X jt−1) where
country j produces the mineral during the same period as country i. This technique to
construct instrumental variables allows me to obtain at least as many instruments as there
5. This assumption is carefully tested in the appendix using the J-test of the over identification. Our
results (table I.I in appendix) shows that for almost all resource markets, there is no evidence against our
choice of instrumental variables.
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are parameters. Let W be a T × k matrix of instruments, assumed to be predetermined,
where k is the number of instruments. The theoretical moment condition is given by :
E(W ′it f (yit ;θ0)) = 0 θ0 ∈Θ, (1.33)
where Wit is the itth row of W .
Let gT (y;θ) = 1T ∑
T
t=0W
′
it f (yit ;θ) and G(y;θ) = ∂g(y;θ)/∂θ . Then the GMM esti-
mator θˆ is the value of θ which minimizes the following criterion function :
QT (θ) = gT (y,θ)′Σ−1gT (y,θ) (1.34)
where Σ is the optimal covariance matrix of the moment variable W ′it f (yit ,θ), Σ =
W ′ΩW . It can be shown that an estimate of the optimal covariance matrix of θˆ is given
by :
V̂ar(θˆ) = T−1
[
G(y; θˆ)′Σˆ−1G(y; θˆ)
]−1
, (1.35)
where Σˆ is a HAC estimator of the covariance matrix Σ=W ′ΩW .
Since the model has many parameters ( 3 + the number of producing countries of
each the resources), the number of instruments used to compute the GMM estimator is
very large. With many instruments, the estimate of the covariance matrix with the usual
procedure, the Newey-West HAC estimator of the covariance matrix Σˆ, is generally not
well conditioned. To obtain a well conditioned HAC estimator, I regularize the Newey-
West HAC estimator with the regularization procedure of Ledoit and Wolf (2004) 6.(see
the Appendix for more details).
6. These authors introduce an estimator of the covariance matrix that is both well-conditioned and
more accurate than the sample covariance matrix asymptotically. Their estimator is distribution-free and
has a simple explicit formula that is easy to compute and interpret.
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1.3.3.2 Computation of the GMM estimator θˆ
To compute the GMM estimator θˆ described above, I use Newton’s method for
constrained nonlinear minimization (see the Appendix for a description of Newton’s
method). Before running Newton’s method to minimize the objective function QT (θ), I
should replace the covariance matrix Σ by the Ledoit and Wolf (2004) HAC estimator ob-
tained from an initial estimation of the model by the NLS method. Like other procedures
that start from preliminary estimates, this one is iterated. Indeed, the GMM estimator re-
siduals are used to calculate a new estimate of the covariance matrix Σ, which is then
used to obtain a second GMM estimator, which is then used to obtain another GMM esti-
mator, until the procedure converges relative to a given criterion. This iterative procedure
is called the iterated GMM and was investigated by Hansen et al. (1996).
1.3.3.3 Analysis of the effect of jumps in prices
As will be discussed in the next section, the estimate of the in-situ price presents
many conjunctural breaks or jumps. One important theoretical assumption about the
behaviour of the resource price is continuity over time. The presence of jumps can be
explained by the existence of some exogenous shocks which are not captured in the basic
model. Denote by ∆λt = λt−λt−1 the difference between two consecutive values of the
in-situ price. The continuity of the in-situ price λt can be interpreted as the regularity of
the distribution of ∆λt . Therefore, any outlier of ∆λt can be interpreted as a jump for the
in-situ price λt . Let assume that ∆λt is normally distributed.
∆λt ∼N (µ∆,σ∆) (1.36)
It follows that an observation ∆λt is an outlier of level x if it satisfies the inequality
∆λt−µ∆
σ∆
> Zx or
∆λt−µ∆
σ∆
<−Zx (1.37)
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Where 1−Φ(Zx) = x/2, Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution of N (0,1). From the
inequality (1.37), a value λt of the in-situ price is a jump if it satisfies the following
inequality
λt > λt−1+µ∆+Zxσ∆ or λt < λt−1+µ∆−Zxσ∆ (1.38)
To take the conjunctural breaks or jumps into account, I create a dummy variable
which takes a value of 1 at a jumping date obtained exogenously from the inequality
(1.38). Denote by Jit this dummy variable. Replacing the elementary function f (yit ;θ)
of the theoretical moment condition (1.33) with the new elementary function f (yit ;θ)−
ηJit , one obtains a moment condition with jump effects. In the next section, such a
model with jump effects will also be estimated and the impact of these jumps will be
verified with the null hypothesis H0 : η = 0. If this null hypothesis is rejected, then the
appropriate specification of the model which must be used to estimate the in-situ price
will be the model with jump effects.
1.3.3.4 Goodness of fit and analysis of the time dimension in parameters
An important goal of this paper is to determine the consistency of the Hotelling
model with the observed data. For this purpose I use two main approaches. First, I check
the explanatory power of the model by plotting the observed market prices versus the
fitted market prices. If the model performs well, the curve obtained will be close to the
45 degree line. Second, I check the structural stability or the time consistency of the
model.
As will be discussed in the next section, the estimate of the in-situ prices shows two
regimes. In the first regime, the in-situ price increases and in the second regime, it de-
creases. My purpose will be to verify whether or not the two regimes are consistent with
the model. To test the structural stability with the GMM estimation method, one should
make a distinction between the identifying and the over identifying stability restrictions.
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While the first restriction concerns the variation of the parameters between the two re-
gimes, the second restriction focuses on the predictive stability. In this paper, I will deal
particularly with the parameter stability. The idea is to compare two estimators which
are assumed to be consistent under different regimes.
The stability investigation needs a special treatment because countries enter and exit
the market at different dates. Indeed, it is not easy to control the parameter β capturing
country fixed effects. Notice that to each country i corresponds a particular parameter βi.
As the dates at which countries enter or exit the market are independent, there may exist
a sub-sample where some countries will not be represented. This situation implies that
the vector of parameters β may be different from one sub-sample to another. Therefore,
to test the parameter stability of the model, one should restrict the analysis to countries
active in the two regimes. To overcome this situation, one could drop from the sample
countries which are not represented in two sub-samples. However, I prefer to solve this
problem differently. I restrict the analysis of the stability to the fixed part (b,α,δ ) of the
vector of parameters θ .
Let A be a k× k matrix of rank 3, which satisfies (b,α,δ ) = Aθ , with k = dim(θ).
Denote by Li, i ∈ {1,2}, the sub-samples designed to test the stability of the Hotelling
model. Li is an interval ofN and L1∩L2 =∅. Let φ0 = (θ1,θ2)∈Φ be the true parameter
value. The theoretical moment condition (1.33) becomes :
E(W ′it f (yit ;φ0)) = E
[
dt(L1)W ′it f (yit ;θ1)+(1−dt(L1))W ′it f (yit ;θ2)
]
= 0 φ0 ∈Φ,
(1.39)
where Wit is the itth row of W and dt(L1) is a dummy variable which equals one
when t ∈ L1. I will call the above moment condition, the " Switching Hotelling model"
to distinguish it from the "Basic Hotelling model" characterized by the moment condi-
tion (1.33). Note that the moment condition (1.39) generalizes the moment condition
(1.33) by incorporating the time dimension in the parameters of the model. This new
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specification will be useful to analyse the effect of time on the behaviour of the in-situ
price.
As in Andrews and Fair (1988), I derive the Wald statistic :
Wstat = T (A1θˆ1−A2θˆ2)′
[
1
pi
A1V̂ar(θˆ1)A′1+
1
1−piA2V̂ar(θˆ2)A
′
2
]−1
(A1θˆ1−A2θˆ2),
(1.40)
where piT = #L1, θˆi is the GMM estimator based on the sub-sample Li, and V̂ar(θˆi)
is a Ledoit-Wolf HAC estimator of Σ based on the Li. This statistic has a limiting χ2(3)
distribution under the identifying restrictions of the two sub-samples and will be used to
test the time consistency of the Hotelling model.
The structural stability of the model developed above must be interpreted with cau-
tion. Indeed, if there is no evidence to reject the null assumption of the structural stability,
this does not mean that the model is time consistent. It simply means that the vector of
parameters (b,α,δ ) = Aθ is time consistent, but not necessarily the vector θ . The se-
cond bloc β of θ can change over the two sub-periods. It is useful to note that even
though a country can extract a resource in the two sub-periods, the parameters β1i and
β2i capturing the last period resource stock are conceptually different. Indeed, by defini-
tion, β1i = Si[piTi] and β2i = SiTi , and in the case of time consistency with respect to the
last period resource stock, the following relation must be satisfied :
β1i =
Ti
∑
s=[piTi]
qis+β2i. (1.41)
Therefore, to verify the time consistency of the model with respect to the last per-
iod resource stock βi, one needs an additional test. However, if the null hypothesis of
structural stability is rejected then the model is really time inconsistent.
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1.4 Application and results
This section presents results obtained by implementing the above methodology to
analyse data for fourteen nonrenewable natural resources : bauxite, copper, gold, hard
coal, iron, lead, natural gas as well as nickel, oil, phosphate, brown coal, silver, tin. and
zinc. In the first subsection, I present the results of what I call the Basic Hotelling model,
where parameters are assumed to be constant over time. These first results are used as a
benchmark to study the structural stability of the model. The following results are based
on the iterated GMM with the convergence criteria fixed on the objective function.
1.4.1 The Basic Hotelling model
To obtain the benchmark model I assume that parameters are constant over time
and that the theoretical moment condition is given by equation (1.33). Two models are
estimated. The second model is an extension of the first model in which I take into
account jump effects in the behaviour of the in-situ price. As I have already mentioned in
the previous section, I create a dummy variable to capture the jump effects. This dummy
variable is associated to an additional parameter η introduced in the Basic Hotelling
model and used to check the conjunctural stability.
I focus particularly on the explanatory power of the model. Since the model is esti-
mated with a method other than the Nonlinear Least Square (NLS), the usual R2 which
measures the goodness of fit is no longer valid. Generally the R2 is less than 0 or greater
than 1, depending on the use of the residuals or the fitted data for calculation. However,
in the present work, even with the GMM method used, most values are between 0.88 and
0.99. One can conclude that the model is probably doing a good job of approximating
the observed data.
To see this clearly, I plot the observed data versus the fitted data. The results are
presented in Figure 1.1. When the dots are around the 45 degree line, this suggests a good
prediction of the model. From this figure, one can conclude that the Hotelling model has
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Figure 1.1 – Measure of the goodness of fit
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a good explanatory power regarding natural resource market prices. The purpose of this
paper being to estimate the in-situ prices, which are not observable, the result that the
fitted prices are close to the observed prices suggests that the outcome for the in-situ
prices will be close to their true values.
Table 1.II presents results based on an implementation of the GMM to estimate the
model with and without jump effects. The empirical model has many parameters. For
brevity, I present results only for the key ones. The parameter β , which is not reported
in the table, is summarized further on a box plot, in Figure 1.2.
Note that the results of the model with jumps and without jumps are only slightly dif-
ferent. This suggests that the exogenous shocks which affect the natural resource market
do not have a significant impact on the behaviour of the resource prices. To formally jus-
tify this point, I compute the test of the null hypothesis that the parameter η associated
to the jumps is equal to 0. The results of this test are reported in the Table 1.II. Except
for gold, hard coal and iron, I find that there is no evidence against η = 0. Therefore,
the Basic Hotelling model captures resource price fluctuations. This can be explained by
the fact that the Basic Hotelling model is a particular form of an error correction model
(see equation (1.22)). That is, the empirical model is designed to explain the fluctuations
in the market price instead of the market price itself. Given this result, we can use the
Basic Hotelling model to estimate the in-situ price without too much concern about the
conjunctural breaks or discontinuities. However, to be as general as possible, my prefe-
rence goes to the model with jump effects, because it captures the conjunctural breaks
found in the case of gold and hard coal.
The following analysis is therefore based on the model with jump effects. It appears
that the stock elasticity b is different from zero except for hard coal and nickel. Thus,
the market prices of hard coal and nickel are not significantly affected by the variation
of the resource stock.
The marginal extraction cost parameter α is close to one for all ores. Parameter α
gives the extent to which marginal extraction cost differs from average extraction cost.
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Tableau 1.II – Estimated results
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
Basic model : jump effects not included
b 0.06 0.00 1.12 0.00 0.18 0.27 0.58 1.00 0.29 0.43 0.00 33.1 0.05 0.01
α 2.63 1.00 1.00 1.44 1.00 1.11 1.52 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00
δ 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Basic model : jump effects included
b 0.30 0.18 1.24 0.00 0.20 0.25 0.44 0.36 0.15 0.32 0.00 0.14 0.24 0.00
α 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.13 1.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00
δ 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Test of the conjunctural breaks (H0 : η = 0)
η -0.5 687.3 -828.6 3.6 0.7 -0.4 -1.5 50.0 3.5 -168.2 -9.5 -90.8 72.6 0.0
χ2 0.00 2.69 179 47.3 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 7.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
p.v. 0.96 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.98 0.90 0.89 0.00 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99
NB : the standard errors of the estimated parameters have not be reported because boundary solutions are
admissible. There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01
(resp. 0.05). OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; BAU, bauxite ;
COP, copper ; IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
With a value close to one, the parameter α indicates that the marginal extraction cost and
the average extraction cost do not differ much. In such a case it should be acceptable to
use the average extraction cost data as a proxy for marginal extraction cost. It is therefore
useful to perform a statistical test of whether or not marginal extraction cost is equal to
average extraction cost. The results are reported in Table 1.III. 7 It indeed appears that the
evidence against a constant marginal extraction cost is weak for all minerals. Although
there is a strong support for a value of 1 for the parameter α , it remains important to
compute its exact value in order to obtain an adequate estimate of the in-situ price.
Tableau 1.III – Test of a constant marginal extraction cost
α = 1 OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χ2 p.v. 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.86 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
The discount rate δ is an essential element of the analysis. The results indicate that
the discount rate is between 0 and 0.10, with most values close to zero. This suggests
that the same valuation is given to present and future cash flow from the extraction of the
7. The results of the Wald statistic reported in this table should be interpreted with caution because
some of the parameter estimates fall on the boundary of the parameter space ( for example α = 1 ). In that
case, the Wald statistic does not have a limiting χ2 distribution (see Andrews (2001)).
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stock of a nonrenewable natural resource. As noted earlier, the parameter δ also captures
the speed at which the market price adjusts to the in-situ price. A δ close to 0 suggests
that the transmission of the information from the in-situ price to the market price is slow.
That is, as the resource becomes scarce, the market price takes time to incorporate this
information.
I did not reported the last period stock βi in Table 1.II. The distribution of βi is very
important because it provides information about the depletion of the resource and the
share of the remaining stock among countries. Figure 1.2 presents the box plot and the
histogram for the end of period resource stock, βi, of oil. The box plot contains seven
handles corresponding to : the smallest observation, the lower quartile, median, upper
quartile, the largest observation and the outliers.
Figure 1.2 – Distribution of the resource stock, βi, of oil
The long right tail and plus signs show the lack of symmetry in the sample values.
This indicates that the large resource stock belongs to few countries. The same patterns
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are observed for other ores. A good estimate of the last period resource stock βi is useful
to obtain an estimate of the current resource stock, Sit given by :
Sit = βi+Rit (1.42)
Since the estimated model has a high explanatory power, we can expect that the
resulting in-situ price will be close to its real value. The in-situ price λt is the price
at which a unit of the current resource stock in the ground Sit could be sold. With an
estimate of the parameter α and the current resource stock Sit , the value of the in-situ
price can be obtained as follows ;
λt =
m
∑
i=1
Sit
∑mk=1 Skt
(Pt−αACit) (1.43)
Figure 1.3 plots the paths of the estimated in-situ prices and of the actual market flow
prices. These figures show that the evolution of the in-situ prices of oil and natural gas
follow similar patterns. For these ores, the in-situ price increases during the period 1970-
1980 and reaches a peak in 1980. From 1981 to 1999, it decreases. Starting in 2000, the
in-situ price exhibits a slight increase for both of those resources. A similar behaviour is
observed for hard coal and brown coal except that the in-situ price continues to decrease
after 2000. As in the case of the market prices, the similarity between the in-situ price
of oil and natural gas as well as the similarity of the in-situ price of brown coal and hard
coal can be explained by the fact that these ores are substitutes. The in-situ price of all
other resources shows a declining trend in recent years, some for quite a long period.
Figure 1.3 also shows the evolution of the observed market flow prices, so as to com-
pare it with the evolution of the in-situ prices. The two prices are highly correlated. This
correlation suggests that, the market price is a projection of the in-situ price. Therefore,
even though the in-situ price is not observable, it would seem that the observed market
flow price can be used as an indicator of its evolution and hence of the evolution of the
scarcity of the nonrenewable resource. However, as already noted, the speed at which the
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information is transmitted from the in-situ prices to market flow prices is low. Because
of this it remains important to get an estimate of the real in-situ price.
For all resources the in-situ price has been decreasing since 1980. In theoretical work,
such a decrease of the in-situ price is sometimes explained by technological progress
which reduces extraction cost. For this fall in the in-situ prices to continue in the long-
run, this technological progress effect should continue to dominate the depletion effect.
It is likely that at some point the depletion effect will begin to offset the technological
progress effect, with the result that the in-situ prices will begin to increase again. Unfor-
tunately the model estimated in this paper cannot predict whether and when this might
happen.
1.4.2 The Regime Switching Hotelling model
The results obtained in the previous section support the use of the Hotelling model
in empirical studies of nonrenewable natural resource markets. However, the resulting
evolution of the in-situ prices shows the existence of two regimes in each case : an in-
creasing and a decreasing regime for in-situ prices. There remains to determine whether
or not the regression parameters are significantly affected by these structural breaks. In
other words, is the model time-consistent. I take as breakpoint the date at which the trend
changes in the in-situ price estimated from the Basic Hotelling. These dates are reported
in Table 1.IV. As can be seen, most of the structural breaks occur between 1975 and
1980. This period is characterized by the world recession and by important adjustments,
particularly in the energy importing countries.
Tableau 1.IV – Test of the structural stability
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN
Breaks 1980 1981 1980 1976 1976 1975 1977 1974 1975 1979 1988 1980 1974
W (103) 36.2 6.7 4.3 0.2 0.09 2.5 1.2 15.7 32.9 9.8 1.2 3.1 2.5
W p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; BAU, bauxite ; COP, copper ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
To capture these regimes switches, I build a model which I call the " Switching
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Figure 1.3 – Evolution of the estimated in-situ prices and the market flow prices
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Hotelling model" to distinguish it from the "Basic Hotelling model" discussed in the
previous section. This Switching Hotelling model assumes that the moment condition
given in equation (1.39) holds. This moment condition allows the parameters to differ
between the two regimes. The Basic Hotelling model is a particular case, where the
parameters are the same (θ1 = θ2 = θ ). With this new specification, it becomes easy to
verify the time consistency of the Hotelling model using the Wald statistic described in
equation (1.40). The results of such a test are reported in Table 1.IV. The stability of the
Basic Hotelling model is rejected for all the resources. Therefore the results obtained in
the previous section for the Basic Hotelling model are not time consistent.
An appropriate specification of the Hotelling model will be to allow the parame-
ters to change between the two regimes. Table 1.V presents the results obtained from
the Switching Hotelling model. As in the case of the Basic model, the Switching Ho-
telling model performs well in approximating the observed market prices, as shown in
Figure 1.4. It also appears that α is still not significantly different from one, so that it is
not unreasonable to assume a constant marginal extraction cost, regardless of the regime.
This is tested explicitly and the results are reported in Table 1.VI. 8 Except for bauxite
and lead, it is apparent that the marginal extraction cost elasticity α may be considered
time consistent for all resources. While the parameter α is approximately the same over
the two regimes, the discount rate appears to vary significantly.
Note from Table 1.V that when the in-situ price is increasing the discount rate is
between 0.10 and 0.50, and it shifts to 0 and 0.10, with most value around zero, when
the in-situ price is decreasing. The shift in discount rate could be one explanation of the
lack of time consistency of the Basic Hotelling model. The fact that the discount rate is
greater in the regime where in-situ price is increasing than in the regime where in-situ
price is decreasing suggests that agents give less value to the future cash flow when their
marginal benefit is increasing and more value to the future cash flow when their marginal
8. The results of the Wald statistic reported in this table should be interpreted with caution because
some of the parameter estimates fall on the boundary of the parameter space ( for example α = 1 ). In that
case, the Wald statistic does not have a limiting χ2 distribution (see Andrews (2001)).
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Figure 1.4 – Goodness of fit in the switching model
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Tableau 1.V – Results of the switching model
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN
Sub-period where the in-situ price is increasing
b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
α 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.26 1.00 1.00 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.00
δ 0.21 0.10 0.36 0.00 0.10 0.53 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.58 0.27 0.48 1.20
Sub-period where the in-situ price is decreasing
b 0.00 0.00 20.1 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.46 5.84 0.02
α 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00 1.14
δ 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
NB : the standard errors of the estimated parameters have not be reported because boundary solutions are
admissible. OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ;
COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
benefit is decreasing.
As already noted, the parameter δ also captures the speed of adjustment of the market
flow price to the in-situ asset price. The fact that its estimated values is larger in the
increasing in-situ price regime than in the decreasing in-situ price regime suggests that
changes in the in-situ price are transmitted faster to the market flow price when the in-
situ price is increasing than when it is decreasing.
As in the case of the Basic Hotelling model, I have not reported the result of the last
period resource stock β .
Tableau 1.VI – Test of a constant marginal extraction cost in the switching model
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN
H0 : α1 = α2
χ2(10−2) 0.04 0.0 0.02 1.31 0.00 0.00 13629 0.01 0.0 2560.5 0.7 0.0 203.6
χ2 p.v. 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.92 1.00 0.15
H0 : α1 = 1
χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.35 0.00 0.00
χ2 p.v. 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.99 1.00
H0 : α2 = 1
χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.009 0.00 0.02
χ2 p.v. 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.88
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc ; The value between ( ) is the standard deviation.
However, it is difficult to obtain a snapshot of its distribution in the switching model
because this distribution is not stationary.
A good estimate of this last period resource stock βit is useful to obtain an estimate
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of the current resource stock, Sit , given by
Sit = βit +Rit ; βit = dt(L1)
(
β1i−
Ti
∑
s=[piTi]
qis
)
+(1−dt(L1))β2i. (1.44)
The above equation shows that the current resource stock Sit is the sum of a conti-
nuous process Rit and a jump process βit . Therefore, the lack of time consistency of the
Basic Hotelling model may also be explained by a jump of the state variable Sit .
The Switching Hotelling model is designed to obtain a time consistent estimate of
the in-situ price. A formula similar to (1.43) obtained in the Basic Hotelling model is
now given by :
λt =
m
∑
i=1
Sit
∑mk=1 Skt
(Pt−αtACit); αt = dt(L1)α1+(1−dt(L1))α2. (1.45)
This formula allows different distribution for the in-situ price in each regime and,
consequently, provides a time consistent estimate of the in-situ price. Theoretically, this
formula is more general than the one obtained in the Basic Hotelling model. Howe-
ver, comparing the two outcomes by plotting the evolution of the in-situ price (see Fi-
gure 1.5), it appears that the behaviour of the in-situ price is only slightly different in the
two models. In order to test whether this difference is statistically significant, denote by
λ b (respectively λ s) the in-situ price obtained from the Basic Hotelling model (respecti-
vely from the Switching Hotelling model). If the two distributions of the in-situ price are
not statistically different then it must have the same mean. Therefore, one can compare
the two outcomes by testing the following null hypothesis :
H0 : E
(
λ st −λ bt
)
= 0, ∀t (1.46)
Note that, the above null hypothesis could be tested using the Student’s t-test. Howe-
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Figure 1.5 – Evolution of the in-situ prices in the switching model
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ver, this requires that the stochastic process λ st −λ bt be normally distributed. This seems
like a very strong assumption in the present context, given the GMM method used. To
be as general as possible, assume that the stochastic variable λ st −λ bt is stationary and
ergodic. Using the Lyapunov condition of the central limit theorem, one can show that
the Wald statistic, given by :
Wstat = m
[ 1
m ∑
m
t=1
(
λ st −λ bt
)−E (λ st −λ bt )]2 ,
Var
(
λ st −λ bt
) (1.47)
follows the χ2(1) distribution. This statistic can be used to test if the differences
between the in-situ price of Basic Hotelling model and the Switching Hotelling model
are statistically significant.
Table 1.VII gives the results of this test. It appears that for 8 of the 13 minerals, there
is no evidence at the one percent level to reject the null hypothesis of equal means.
Tableau 1.VII – Test of equal means
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN
H0 : E(λ st ) = E(λbt )
χ2 13.4 1.50 13.4 16.4 195.0 0.09 0.21 0.35 135.0 1.26 0.29 1.15 2.07
χ2p.v. 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.64 0.55 0.00 0.26 0.58 0.28 0.15
H0 : E(λ sit) = E(λ
b
it )
χ2(×103) 3.10 0.62 2.99 7.03 4.93 4.93 1.74 4.52 2.66 1.20 1.27 1.12 4.75
χ2p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H0 : E(λ sit) = E(λ
0
it)
χ2(×103) 5.62 0.74 0.01 2.33 4.93 4.93 1.54 1.74 2.66 2.01 0.38 0.01 4.75
χ2p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
Therefore, for most resources, the time consistent estimate of the in-situ price λ st has
the same mean as the time inconsistent estimate λ bt . However, this does not mean that
the two in-situ prices have the same distribution. It simply implies that the stochastic
relation between λ st and λ bt can be described by the following stochastic equation :
λ st = λ
b
t +ut ; E(ut) = 0 (1.48)
The above relation states that the difference between the time-consistent and the
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time-inconsistent estimates of the in-situ price is a zero-mean process.
1.5 Conclusion
Hotelling (1931) proposed a framework to explain theoretically the optimal extrac-
tion of nonrenewable natural resource. One fundamental result was that the in-situ price,
which is an economic measure of the resource scarcity should grow at the rate of inter-
est. This principle, known as the Hotelling rule has been unsuccessfully tested, in good
part because the in-situ price is not observable. The fundamental question however is
whether or not the Hotelling principle can be used to explain the observed behaviour
of the market price and, if possible, to estimate the unobserved behaviour of the in-situ
price (Livernois, 2009).
This paper presents a framework to evaluate the Hotelling model and estimate the
unobserved in-situ price. The paper offers three main contributions. Instead of using the
property of time series on the market price or an estimate of the in-situ price to evaluate
the Hotelling model, I combine the first-order conditions for optimal resource extraction
to estimate a market price relation which is consistent with the Hotelling model. Instead
of an econometric approximation of the marginal extraction cost, I use average extraction
cost data as a proxy for marginal cost to estimate the unobserved in-situ price. Those
two contributions can be summarized in three steps. First, I assume a functional form
for extraction cost in order to use average extraction cost as a proxy for marginal cost.
Second, I combine equilibrium conditions to estimate a market price which is consistent
with the Hotelling model. Finally, I derive an estimate of the corresponded in-situ price.
The other contribution of this paper is the empirical technique used to investigate the
Hotelling model of a nonrenewable resource extraction. I use the Regime Switching
GMM estimation with panel data. This robust estimation technique seems to be very
useful to handle the endogenous property of the average extraction cost and discuss the
time consistency of the Hotelling model.
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The methodology is applied to analyse fourteen non-renewable natural resource prices.
I find results that strongly support the use of the Hotelling model as a framework to ana-
lyze the behaviour of natural resource prices. It appears that the Hotelling model explains
88 to 99 per cent of the observed market prices.
Using appropriate breakpoints to evaluate the stability of my estimations I find that
there are two regimes. The first regime is characterized by an increasing in-situ price and
the second regime by a decreasing in-situ price. Using a regime-switching model to re-
concile the Hotelling model with the change of regime, I find that this time inconsistency
does not have a significant impact on the explanatory power of the model. However, this
new specification of the model provides useful information on the behaviour of the na-
tural resource markets. It appears that the rate at which agents discount the future is
high in the regime where the in-situ price is increasing and low when the in-situ price
is decreasing. This suggests that agents given less valuations to future cash flows when
their marginal benefit is increasing and more when their marginal benefit is decreasing.
Furthermore, I find that the average extraction cost data is a good proxy for the marginal
extraction cost : marginal extraction cost does not seem to be significantly different from
average extraction cost regardless of the regime. The time-consistent estimates of in-situ
prices either decrease or exhibit an inverted U-shape form over time and it is highly cor-
related to the market price. Furthermore, the difference between the time-consistent and
the time-inconsistent estimate of the in-situ price is simply a zero-mean process.
Some encouraging results have been obtained in this paper about the use of the Ho-
telling model as a framework to analyze nonrenewable natural resource markets. Un-
fortunately, the dynamic of the market price derived from the optimal conditions of the
Hotelling model estimated in this paper has some limitations. In particular, it does not
permit any predictions as to whether, and much less when, the in-situ price will start
increasing in the long run, as the basic theoretical Hotelling framework predicts must
eventually happen.
CHAPITRE 2
TESTING EMPIRICALLY FOR LINEARITY IN THEIR STOCK OF THE
EXTRACTION RATES OF NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to test whether an equilibrium under which the rates of ex-
traction of nonrenewable resources are linear in the stock of the resource is consistent
with observed data. I first show that with a time varying demand characterized by a
constant price elasticity and a time varying extraction cost function characterized by
constant elasticities with respect to the rate of extraction and to the remaining stock,
there exists an equilibrium in which the extraction rate is proportional to the stock of re-
source if and only if the discount rate and the demand and cost parameters satisfy a very
specific relationship. I then use panel data on fourteen nonrenewable natural resources
to test whether this relationship is satisfied empirically. I find that if the parameters are
assumed time invariant, then for six of the fourteen resources I cannot reject the hypo-
thesis. This changes however if I account for structural changes over time, in which case
the hypothesis is rejected for all fourteen resources.
2.1 Introduction
The Hotelling model of nonrenewable resource exploitation has dominated the eco-
nomics of exhaustible resources for decades. Since the famous publication of Hotelling
(1931), this model has been used to understand the long-run behaviour of prices and
optimal extraction rates of nonrenewable natural resources under different market struc-
tures. The basic Hotelling model says that the in-situ price (the price of a unit of the
resource in the ground) should increase at the rate of interest when the stock of the re-
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source is optimally extracted. 1 Although there is an important empirical literature on the
behaviour of resource prices (such as Livernois (2009) or Slade and Thille (2009)), there
is little information about the behaviour or the functional form of the optimal resource
extraction rate. The theoretical literature argues that the optimal extraction rate should
decrease over time as the resource stock gets depleted. Some authors, such as Lin and
Wagner (2007), have, for empirical purposes, taken the optimal extraction rate to be a
linear function of the resource stock or of the cumulative resource extracted. A rate of
extraction that is proportional to the remaining resource stock is attractive for its simpli-
city and its tractability. There remains to see, however, whether such an equilibrium is
consistent with the observed data. That is the purpose of this paper.
It is found that for six of the fourteen natural resource markets considered, the hypo-
thesis that there is a linear relationship between the rate of extraction and the remaining
stock of the resource cannot be rejected. However, if the possibility of structural breaks
are taken into account, the hypothesis is rejected for all fourteen resources.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follow. In Section 2.2, I derive theoreti-
cally, given specific functional forms for demand and extraction cost, a necessary condi-
tion for the existence of an equilibrium that has the property that the rate of extraction is
proportional to the stock of the resource. The functional forms assumed are an iso-elastic
time varying demand and a time varying extraction cost that depends on both the rate of
extraction and remaining resource stock, also with constant elasticities. An econometric
specification is proposed in Section 2.3, which suggests an approach to testing for the
linearity in the stock of the extraction rate. This approach is then used in Section 2.4 to
analyze data of fourteen nonrenewable natural resource markets. In Section 2.5 I offer
some concluding remarks.
1. There are important theoretical contributions which have extended the basic Hotelling model to
accommodate more realistic economic features in the prediction of resource prices. See Krautkraemer
(1998) or Gaudet (2007) for surveys of those contributions.
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2.2 The basic Hotelling model of resource extraction
Consider a representative price-taking firm extracting a known and finite stock of a
nonrenewable natural resource. The representative firm chooses a time path of resource
extraction to maximize the present value of the stream of net benefits subject to the
constraint that the cumulative extraction be not greater than the initial resource endow-
ment. The extraction cost, the principal characteristic of the firm, is subject to technolo-
gical progress, which causes the cost to decrease, and to a stock effect, which causes the
cost to increase.
The notation follows closely that used in Atewamba (2011) and Lin and Wagner
(2007). At time t ∈ [0,+∞], the supply of the mineral is given by q(t), the extraction flow
at time t. The cost of extracting q(t) at time t is denoted by C(z(t),q(t),S(t)), where S(t)
is the remaining stock of the resource at time t and z(t) is a productivity index indicating
the state of extraction technology. It will be assumed that Cz < 0, Cs < 0, Css > 0 Cq > 0
and Cqq ≥ 0, where Cq denotes the partial derivative ∂C/∂q, etc. It will also be assumed
that the average extraction cost is an increasing function of the extraction rate, so that
Cq(z,q,S)≥ C(z,q,S)q , ∀q≥ 0. (2.1)
Denote by p(t) the endogenous market price of the resource at time t. The correspon-
ding demand is given by D(θ(t), p(t)), which is assumed to be a decreasing and convex
function of the market price p (∂D/∂ p < 0 and ∂ 2D/∂ p2 > 0). As for the exogenous
parameter θ(t), it can be viewed as capturing changes which occur in the economy and
affect the demand for the resource. I will assume that demand is an increasing function
of θ (Dθ ≥ 0).
At each time t, the market price p(t) adjusts to equate the aggregate supply q(t) to
the aggregate demand D(θ(t), p(t)), so that
q(t) = D(θ(t), p(t)), ∀t ∈ [0,T ], (2.2)
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where T is the date of exhaustion of the resource stock, which may be infinite.
In making its extraction decision, the firm takes as given the demand price of the
resource p(t) = D−1(q(t),θ(t)). The optimal control problem it faces is to choose a
time path of resource extraction, q(t), to maximize
∫ T
0
e−δ t [p(t)q(t)−C(z(t),q(t),S(t))]dt (2.3)
subject to
S˙(t) =−q(t); q(t)≥ 0 ∀t (2.4)
lim
t→T
S(t)≥ 0; T is free (2.5)
S(0) = S0 is given, (2.6)
where δ denotes the rate of discount.
Letting λ (t) denote the in-situ price of the resource stock, the current value of the
Hamiltonian for this problem is then
H(t,q(t),S(t),λ (t)) = p(t)q(t)−C(z(t),q(t),S(t))−λ (t)q(t). (2.7)
The economic efficiency requires that
∂H
∂q
= p−Cq(z,q,S)−λ = 0 (2.8)
λ˙ = δλ − ∂H
∂S
= δλ +Cs(z,q,S), (2.9)
where λ˙ denotes the time derivative of λ and where the time argument is implicit.
Solving the differential equation (2.8) and rearranging the solution, I obtain the ex-
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pression for the in-situ price of the resource, namely
λ (t) = λ0eδ t +
∫ t
0
Cs(z(τ),q(τ),S(τ))eδ (t−τ)dτ. (2.10)
Substituting the in-situ price (2.10) into the static efficiency condition (2.8), I obtain
the following formula for the market price of the nonrenewable natural resource :
p(t) = λ0eδ t +
∫ t
0
Cs(z(τ),q(τ),S(τ))eδ (t−τ)dτ+Cq(z(t),q(t),S(t)). (2.11)
In order to make this expression empirically tractable, specific functional forms will be
assumed for the demand D(θ , p) and the extraction cost C(z,q,S). More precisely, I will
assume an iso-elastic time-varying demand given by
D(θ , p) = θ
1
η p−
1
η ; θ˙ = aθ , (2.12)
where η is the absolute value of the inverse of the demand elasticity. The demand curve
is growing over time if a is positive and is decreasing if a is negative. This demand
function satisfies all the properties assumed above. As for the extraction cost function, it
will be assumed to take the following form :
C(z,q,S) = z−1qαS−b; z˙ = γz, z0 ≥ 0 (2.13)
where b≥ 0 is the non-negative stock effect elasticity, γ ≥ 0 is the non-negative growth
rate of technology, and α ≥ 1 is the output elasticity of extraction cost. Cost rises as
the resource is depleted and, all else equal, a one-percent decrease in the resource stock
causes extraction cost to increase by b percent. Technological progress causes cost to
decrease and, all else equal, a one-percent improvement in technology causes cost to
decrease by 1 percent. Notice that if α = 1, marginal extraction cost is equal to average
extraction cost, whereas if α > 1, the average extraction is increasing in the extraction
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rate and marginal cost is greater than average cost for any positive rate of extraction.
Given those functional forms, we can prove the following proposition :
Proposition 1. : If and only if the discount rate satisfies
δ = a+ηg (2.14)
where the constant g is
g =
α(a+ γ)
α(b−η−α+1)−b (2.15)
then there exists an equilibrium such that
q(t) = gS(t), (2.16)
with the constant g being positive if (i) α < b, (ii) −γ ≤ a and (iii) η ≤ α−1(α−1)(b−
α)
For the proof of this proposition see Appendix II.2.
The three conditions for the constant g to be positive are derived from the fact that g is
positive if and only if the numerator and the denominator of (2.15) are of the same sign,
or in other words (a+γ)[α(b−η−α+1)−b]≥ 0. To see this, notice that there are two
cases. First, suppose that a+γ ≥ 0 and α(b−η−α+1)−b≥ 0. It follows that a≥−γ
and η ≤ α−1(α−1)(b−α). Second, suppose that a+γ ≤ 0 and α(b−η−α+1)−b≤
0. It follows that a ≤ −γ and η ≥ α−1(α − 1)(b−α). As a ≤ 0, the demand always
decreases over time. This is not realistic. So I impose η ≤ α−1(α−1)(b−α) to allow
for the possibility that demand be increasing over time.
Condition (i) of the Proposition 1 ensures that the inverse of the absolute value of the
demand elasticity η is positive. Conditions (ii) and (iii) ensure that the extraction growth
rate g is positive even if the demand growth rate a is negative. Note that this equilibrium
is unique if the demand for the resource is elastic, 0≤ η ≤ 1. 2 Furthermore, if average
2. The proof of this statement is in the Appendix
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extraction cost is equal to marginal extraction cost (α = 1), then, from condition (iii),
demand for the resource is infinitely elastic (η = 0) ; it then follows from expression
(2.15) that g=∞. Hence the rate of change of the resource stock is minus infinity, which
means that the stock is depleted instantaneously. To rule out this uninteresting case it
will be assumed that α > 1, and therefore both marginal and average cost are increasing,
with the latter everywhere greater than average cost for all positive rates of extraction.
We have so far neglected the terminal date T , which is endogenous. Its determination
is given by the following proposition :
Proposition 2. : With iso-elastic time-varying demand and increasing marginal and
average extraction cost (α > 1), if the equilibrium extraction rate is of the form q = gS
then,
i - it will not be efficient to leave any stock in ground so that is S(T ) = 0 ;
ii- the terminal date is T = ∞.
The proof of this proposition is provided in Appendix II.3.
The requirement that the discount rate satisfies (2.14) in order for the equilibrium
described in Proposition 1 to exist is of course a very stringent one. Our task is now, in
what follows, to estimate the various parameters of the model that enter in expression
(2.15) for g so as to be able to test statistically whether the constraint (2.14) is satisfied
for some of the resources.
2.3 Empirical analysis of the equilibrium
In this section, I propose an empirical specification that can be used to estimate the
relevant parameters and perform statistical test on whether condition (2.14) holds empi-
rically.
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2.3.1 Data and the empirical model
I use the same data as in Atewamba (2011). 3 This database is a compilation of the
data on several countries producing a nonrenewable natural resource. It contains average
annual world price, country’s average cost and country’s current stock data for 14 ores
from previously unpublished World Bank data. The commodities are bauxite, copper,
gold, hard coal, iron, lead, natural gas as well as nickel, oil, phosphate, brown coal,
silver, tin. and zinc. The data cover 35 years from 1970 to 2004. The summary statistics
on the ores which are analyzed in this empirical section are presented in Appendix II.1.
The market price is common to all countries, while the extraction costs are particular to
each country. An appropriate way to account for the unspecified characteristics of each
country on which those cost depend will be to introduce country effects, which may be
captured by a constant term. This will be discussed in the continuation.
A discrete form associated to the first-order condition (2.8) of the Hotelling model is
given by
pt− pt−1 = δ (pt−1−αACit−1)+α(ACit−ACit−1)−bqitSit ACit ∀i, t (2.17)
where i is the country index and t is the time index. The only unobservable variable of
the price dynamic (2.17) is the current resource stock Sit . Extracting the current stock Sit
from equation (2.16) of Proposition 1 and substituting into (2.17), the dynamic of price
becomes
pt− pt−1 = δ (pt−1−αACit−1)+α(ACit−ACit−1)−bgACit ∀i, t. (2.18)
This equation can allow us to estimate the parameters δ , α , b and the stock growth rate
g. However, to verify if the equilibrium condition (2.14) holds, I need also to estimate
parameters η and a.
3. The database was downloaded directly from http ://gwagner.com/research/hotelling/, provided by
Lin and Wagner (2007). It is described in detail in their Appendix B.
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Substituting expression (2.12) for the demand function into (2.2) and taking the lo-
garithm of the resulting equation, I obtain
log(qit) = di+
a
η
t− 1
η
log(pt) ∀i, t, (2.19)
where di is a constant term that captures the country effect i. This equation can allow us
to estimate the additional parameters η and a. It follows from (2.18) and (2.19) that the
empirical model to be estimated is given by
pt− pt−1 = δ (pt−1−αACit−1)+α(ACit−ACit−1)−bgACit +uit
log(qit) = di+ aη t− 1ηLog(pt)+ vit
 (2.20)
subject to the constraints
b≥α > 1; δ ≥ 0; η ≥ 0; γ ≥ 0; −γ ≤ a; η ≤α−1(α−1)(b−α),
(2.21)
where uit and vit are error terms which can be correlated within countries.
Note that the main purpose of the empirical model (2.20) is to determine whether
or not the equilibrium condition (2.14) is satisfied for some natural resources. From
equation (2.14) of Proposition 1, the null hypothesis of the existence of an equilibrium
that is linear in the stock is formulated as follow :
H0 : δ = a+ηg; with g =
α(a+ γ)
α(b−η−α+1)−b (2.22)
In what follows, I will specify an appropriated econometric model to estimate the empi-
rical model (2.20) and test condition (2.22).
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2.3.2 Econometric specification
The empirical model (2.20) developed in the previous subsection is nonlinear in b, α ,
γ , δ , η , a and di. The difference between this empirical model and the one estimated in
Atewamba (2011) is the existence of a second equation, which captures the equilibrium
in the market for the resource. The method of estimation depends on the nature of the
explanatory variables and the further assumptions made on the behaviour of the error
terms. In the simplest case, if the explanatory variables are exogenous and the error term
follows a normal distribution, an appropriate estimation method is the Maximum Likeli-
hood. The Maximum Likelihood Estimator has important properties of efficiency, but its
well known limitation is the normality assumption of the error terms. A more general and
frequently used approach is to assume that the behaviour of the error terms is unknown.
In that situation, if the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, a convenient estima-
tion method is the Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) method. But the average extraction
cost is a function of the extraction rate, which is an endogenous variable. Therefore, in
addition to the market price pt and the extraction rate qit , it will be appropriate to treat
the average extraction cost as an endogenous variable. This implies that the NLS method
may no longer be an appropriate estimation method. It is important to take into account
this endogeneity property to obtain a consistent estimator of the parameters. The Gene-
ralized Method of Moments (GMM), which includes the NLS as a special case, provides
a solution (see Matyas (1999)). Note that the GMM estimator is a M.estimator, which is
asymptotically normal under minimal restrictions on the distribution of the error terms. 4
Although, the GMM estimation method is technically more complex with multiple equa-
tions than a single equation 5, its theoretical framework is the same. I will now discuss
4. The method requires that a certain number of moment conditions be specified by the model. These
moment conditions are functions of the parameters of the model and of the data, such that their expectation
is zero at the true values of the parameters. GMM estimators are known to be consistent, asymptotically
normal, and efficient in the class of all estimators that don’t use any extra information aside from that
contained in the moment conditions.
5. In Atewamba (2011), the GMM estimation method was based on a single equation. Technically,
a GMM method applied to a single equation is less complex than a GMM method applied to a multiple
equations. However, the theory remains the same for both.
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the way this estimation method can be used to fit the Hotelling model (2.20).
2.3.2.1 Switching GMM estimation
As observed in Atewamba (2011), the Hotelling model exhibits two significant re-
gimes. The first regime is characterized by an increase of the resource price and the
second regime is characterized by a decrease of the resource price. As a result, the Ho-
telling model has been verified to be subject to a structural shift (Atewamba, 2011).
Therefore, it will be appropriate to take into account those two regimes in the estima-
tion of the empirical model (2.20). A Switching GMM estimation technique provides a
solution.
Denote the parameters to be estimated by θ = (b,α,γ,δ ,η ,a,d1, ...,dn) ∈ Θ and
the observable variables by yit = (pt , pt−1,ACit ,ACit−1,qit) , and let θ0 ∈ Θ be the true
parameter value. Let us assume
f1(yit ;θ0) = uit , E(uit) = 0, θ0 ∈Θ, (2.23)
f2(yit ;θ0) = vit , E(vit) = 0
where f1(yit ;θ) = pt− (1+δ )pt−1−αACit +α(1+δ )ACit−1+bgACit and f2(yit ;θ) =
Log(qit)−di− aη t+ 1ηLog(pt) are elementary functions, or residuals. Grouping all these
residuals in a 2T ×1 vector f (y;θ), I assume
E
[
f (y;θ0) f (y;θ0)′
]
=Ω, θ0 ∈Θ, (2.24)
where Ω is an unknown positive definite matrix and T = ∑ni=1 Ti.
Now denote by wit the instrumental variables for country i. The variable wit is consti-
tuted with variables (ACit−1,qit−1,Xit−1) and (AC jt−1,q jt−1,X jt−1), where country j
produces the mineral during the same period as country i and Xit is the cumulative re-
source stock extracted in country i at time t. This technique for constructing instrumental
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variables allows me to obtain at least as many instruments as there are parameters. 6 Let
Wl be a T × kl matrix of instruments, l = 1,2 , assumed to be predetermined, where
k = k1+ k2 is the number of instruments, with kl greater or equal to the number of para-
meters in the function fl . Denote by W the diagonal block matrix of W1 and W2.
Now, let us determine the moment condition of the model. Denote by Rl , l ∈ {1,2},
the sub-samples corresponding to the two regimes of the model. Rl is a subset of N and
R1 ∩R2 = ∅. Let φ0 = (θ1,θ2) ∈ Φ be the true parameter value, where θl is the true
parameter value of the regime l = 1,2. The theoretical moment condition is given by
E(W ′it f (yit ;φ0)) = E
[
dt(R1)W ′it f (yit ;θ1)+(1−dt(R1))W ′it f (yit ;θ2)
]
= 0 φ0 ∈Φ,
(2.25)
where Wit is the itth row of W and dt(R1) is a dummy variable which equals one when
t ∈ R1. I will call the above moment condition the " Switching Hotelling model" to
distinguish it from the "Basic Hotelling model", where no regime is considered. If the
two regimes R1 and R2 are statistically significant then the moment condition (2.25)
allows us to incorporate their effect into our estimation. As in Atewamba (2011), to
verify the statistical significance of the Switching Hotelling model, I restrict the analysis
of the time varying parameters to the fixed part of the parameter θ , that is b,α,γ,δ ,η
and a. Let A be a k× k matrix of rank 6, which satisfies (b,α,γ,δ ,η ,a) = Aθ , with
k = dim(θ). As in Andrews and Fair (1988), I derive the Wald statistic as follows :
Wstat = T (A1θˆ1−A2θˆ2)′
[
1
pi
A1V̂ar(θˆ1)A′1+
1
1−piA2V̂ar(θˆ2)A
′
2
]−1
(A1θˆ1−A2θˆ2),
(2.26)
where piT = #R1, θˆl is the GMM estimator 7 based on the sub-sample Rl , and V̂ar(θˆl) is
a Ledoit-Wolf HAC estimator of Σ based on the Rl . 8 This statistic has a limiting χ2(6)
6. As reported in the Table II.I in the Appendix H, the J-test shows that those choices of instruments
match the data very well for almost all resources.
7. See Appendix II.6 for more details on the GMM estimator
8. Since the model has many parameters ( 6 + the number of producing countries of each the re-
sources), the number of instruments used to compute the GMM estimator is very large. With many ins-
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distribution under the identifying restrictions of the two sub-samples and will be used to
test the structural stability of the Hotelling model with a constant stock growth rate and
an iso-elastic time varying demand 9
2.3.2.2 Computation of the GMM estimator θˆ
For each regime a GMM estimator is obtained by minimizing an objective function
QT (θ) obtained from the moment condition (2.25). 10 To compute the GMM estimator
θˆ for each regime, I use Newton’s method for constrained nonlinear minimization (See
Appendix II.7 for a description of Newton’s method). Before running Newton’s method
to minimize the objective function QT (θ), I should replace the covariance matrix Σ in
QT (θ) by the Ledoit and Wolf (2004) HAC estimator obtained from an initial estima-
tion of the model by the NLS method. Like other procedures that start from preliminary
estimates, this one is iterated. Indeed, the GMM estimator residuals are used to calcu-
late a new estimate of the covariance matrix Σ, which is then used to obtain a second
GMM estimator, which is then used to obtain another GMM estimator, until the proce-
dure converges relative to a given criterion. This iterative procedure is called the iterated
GMM and was investigated by Hansen et al. (1996).
truments, the estimate of the covariance matrix with the usual procedure, the Newey-West HAC estimator
of the covariance matrix Σˆ (see Appendix II.4 is generally not well conditioned. To obtain a well condi-
tioned HAC estimator, I regularize the Newey-West HAC estimator with the regularization procedure
of Ledoit and Wolf (2004). These authors introduce an estimator of the covariance matrix that is both
well-conditioned and more accurate than the sample covariance matrix asymptotically. Their estimator is
distribution-free and has a simple explicit formula that is easy to compute and interpret.
9. The structural stability of the model developed here must be interpreted with caution. Indeed, if
there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of structural stability, this does not mean that parameters
of the model are constant over time. It simply means that the vector of parameters (b,α,γ,δ ,η ,a) = Aθ is
constant over time, but not necessarily the vector θ . The second block d = (d1,d2, ...,dn) of θ can change
over the two sub-periods.
10. See Davidson and Mackinnon (2003) for more details on the construction of the objective function
QT (θ) and the Newton method of optimization.
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2.3.2.3 Test of the existence of a linear equilibrium
The main purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not condition (2.22) is
consistent with the data. This condition is equivalent to
H0 : h(θ) = δ −a− ηα(a+ γ)α(b−η−α+1)−b = 0. (2.27)
Under the null hypothesis (2.27), one can show that the Wald statistic
Wstat = h
′
(θˆ)
[
H(θˆ)V̂ar(θˆ)H
′
(θˆ)
]−1
h(θˆ) (2.28)
is asymptotically distributed as χ2(r), where H(θˆ) is an r×k matrix with typical element
∂h j/∂θi. 11 The Wald statistic (2.28) will be used to determine, for each of the resource
markets under consideration, whether or not condition (2.22) is satisfied. Note that if
the null hypothesis (2.27) is rejected, it will not mean that there is no equilibrium to
Hotelling model of resource extraction. It would mean that assumptions made for the
demand and cost functions are not appropriate for observed data.
2.4 Empirical results
This section presents results obtained by implementing the above methodology to
analyze data for fourteen nonrenewable natural resources : bauxite, copper, gold, hard
coal, iron, lead, natural gas as well as nickel, oil, phosphate, brown coal, silver, tin. and
zinc. General results of the estimations are presented in the first subsection, while the
existence of an equilibrium is discussed in the second subsection.
2.4.1 General Results
Recall that the estimation results are based on the GMM estimation method. GMM
estimators are known to be consistent, asymptotically normal, and efficient in the class
11. As r=1, I can also use the t-statistic, the square of the Wald statistic (2.28), to test (2.27).
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of all estimators that do not use any extra information aside from that contained in the
moment conditions. Therefore, it is important to first determine whether the moment
conditions (2.25) match the data well or not. The over-identification test or the J-test
provides the answer. 12 Results of this J-test are reported in the Table II.I, in Appen-
dix II.8. It appears that for almost all resources the moment conditions match the data
very well for all regimes. 13
Aside from the GMM specification test, there is a question of whether the Structural
or Switching GMM considered is acceptable or not. Table 2.I reports results from the
implementation of the Wald statistic (2.26) for the structural break test. 14 As in Ate-
wamba (2011), it appears that the parameters of the Hotelling model vary over time.
Therefore, the Switching GMM estimation technique is appropriate to take the time va-
rying property of parameters into account for a suitable estimation of parameters and test
statistics.
Tableau 2.I – Test of the structural stability
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN
Breaks 1980 1981 1980 1976 1976 1975 1977 1974 1975 1979 1988 1980 1974
W (103) 242.8 270.2 3.3 151.5 26.3 22.5 1.9 0.7 9.6 0.5 2.25 5.1 29.1
W p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; BAU, bauxite ; COP, copper ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
The results reported in Table 2.II are based on a Switching GMM estimation tech-
nique. For the sake of brevity, only results on key parameters are reported. It appears
that for almost all resources, the parameter α , which captures the gap between average
extraction cost and marginal extraction cost is close to 1 in both regimes. Although this
result is similar to the one obtained in Atewamba (2011), it does not suggest that the
12. See Matyas (1999) for more information on the J-test
13. In fact, a sufficient condition for the moment conditions (2.25) to be verified is that it is verified in
each regime. As a result, a Switching GMM estimation can be reduced to applying a GMM in each regime
(see Matyas (1999)).
14. For the structural stability test, I use the same break points as in Atewamba (2011). They correspond
to the date at which the trend changes in prices of resources. These dates are reported in Table 2.I. As it
appears, most of the structural breaks occur between 1975 and 1980. This period is characterized by the
world recession and by important adjustments, particularly in the energy importing countries.
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average extraction cost could be used as a proxy for marginal extraction cost. Formally,
the marginal extraction cost elasticity should be greater than one for an equilibrium to
exist (see Proposition 1).
Tableau 2.II – Estimation results
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
Sub-period where the price is increasing
α 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 2.16 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.27 1.00 1.00 .
(0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (1.36) (2.09) (0.38) (0.00) (1.11) (1.10) (1.72) (0.29) (0.38) .
b∗ 1.39 4.41 0.00 1.66 6.28 0.00 31.7 2.84 0.71 7.21 0.00 0.00 4.31 .
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) .
γ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
δ 0.20 0.24 1.02 0.22 0.23 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.69 0.78 .
η 4.92 5.19 0.01 3.00 9.60 7.23 84.0 1.51 2.57 2.45 1.19 0.00 4.80 .
a 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
(0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (1.06) (0.50) (0.00) (1.30) (0.29) (1.80) (1.69) (0.00) .
Sub-period where the price is decreasing
α 1.00 1.00 3.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.60 1.00 1.00
(6.51) (1.83) (1.41) (2.12) (5.50) (0.62) (1.47) (2.09) (2.10) (0.57) (0.75) (0.14) (0.34) (0.00)
b∗ 0.26 0.16 0.00 0.74 0.08 0.90 1.24 2.11 0.14 1.68 0.00 0.00 2.59 0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
γ 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
δ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
η 3.95 0.56 0.04 8.03 1.78 2.73 1.06 2.24 1.42 1.67 0.24 0.00 1.97 3.56
a -0.07 0.00 -0.00 -0.25 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.00
NB : The values between parentheses are the standard errors. The standard errors of some estimated parameters have not be
reported because boundary solutions are admissible. The sign (*) means that the value of the parameter should be multiplied.
by 104. OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO phosphate ; COP, copper ;
BAU, bauxite ; IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
The discount rate δ is close to zero in the regime where the resource price is decrea-
sing over time. Furthermore, the discount rate is larger in the regime where the resource
price is increasing than in the regime where the resource price is decreasing. This would
suggest that, at least under the specification of the model retained here, agents are likely
to give more value to their future incomes from resource extraction when the price of the
resource is decreasing than when the price of the resource is increasing.
The value of b, which measures the stock effect on extraction costs, is very large
compared to the one obtained in Atewamba (2011). This result may be explained by the
additional constraint b ≥ α imposed on the parameter b in order to obtaining a positive
value for g. In order to understand how this result may affect the test statistic (2.28)
for the existence of a linear equilibrium, I relax the constraint b ≥ α and reestimate
the empirical model (2.20). However, to ensure that the resource stock growth rate g
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is non-negative, I assume that the demand for the resource decreases over time, that
is the parameter a is negative. Results of this new estimation is reported in Table II.II
of Appendix II.9. It appears that the value of b is close to zero for almost all natural
resources, as found in Atewamba (2011), and g is positive, as required. As discussed
in Appendix II.9, assuming that the demand of the resource decreases over time does
not have a significant impact on the test statistic (2.28) for the existence of a linear
equilibrium.
One of the results of the estimations is the value of γ , the rate of technological pro-
gress in extraction. As reported in Table 2.II, it is close to zero when the resource price
is increasing and smaller than when the resource price is decreasing. This suggests that
the technological progress may partially explain the decrease of resource prices.
The value of a, the exogenous rate of growth of demand, is negative for all resources.
This observation can justify the assumption a≤ 0 used for the reestimation of the empi-
rical model (2.20) (see Appendix II.9 for more details).
Estimates of the parameter g obtained under the constraints (i), (ii) and (iii) of the
Proposition 1 are reported in the Table 2.III. It appears to be close to zero in all cases,
but larger in the regime where the resource price is decreasing than in the regime where
the resource price is increasing. This result suggests that agents extract at a larger rate
when the price is decreasing than when the price is increasing.
Tableau 2.III – Estimates of the parameter g
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
All data
g(10−6) 0.00 0.00 374 77.9 1.27 550 4.67 9.43 111 0.87 72.1 0.00 1.21 0.02
Regime where the price increases
g(10−12) 9.25 1.03 577 74.3 0.00 0.00 0.61 7.60 166 2.48 0.00 8.48 0.46 .
Regime where the price decreases
g(10−6) 63.2 55.8 0.00 10.1 89.3 15.0 11.8 4.58 50.9 9.79 725 932 0.25 0.02
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
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2.4.2 Existence of an equilibrium of the Hotelling model
The main purpose of this paper is to test whether the condition (2.14), which is
required for the existence of the linear equilibrium described in Proposition 1 to exist, is
consistent with the observed data. To this effect, the results of the implementation of the
Wald statistic (2.26) is reported in Table 2.IV. To ensure the robustness of my results, I
implement this test for each identified subperiods as well as for the entire period.
Tableau 2.IV – Test of the existence of a linear equilibrium
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
Entire period
χ2 0.00 0.01 0.02 487 124 235 188 128 889 588 0.02 0.00 217 0.95
χ2 p.v. 0.99 0.93 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.99 0.00 0.33
Sub-period where the price is increasing
χ2 321 280 635 431 344 0.00 191 531 423 476 0.00 239 510 .
χ2 p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 .
Sub-period where the price is decreasing
χ2 561 749 0.00 130 363 198 433 281 627 522 377 89.0 810 0.95
χ2 p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc ; The value between ( ) is the standard deviation.
Consider first the two sub-periods. We may conclude that the equilibrium proposed
in Proposition 1 is consistent with the data for a given resource if there is no evidence
to reject the null hypothesis (2.27) for both sub-periods. From Table 2.IV, it appears
that, except for phosphate and nickel markets, the null hypothesis is rejected when the
resource price is increasing, and, except for gold and tin, it is rejected when the resource
price is decreasing. In other words, for all resources the null hypothesis is rejected in
at least one of the sub-periods. Therefore, the equilibrium proposed in Proposition 1
appears not to be consistent with the data.
If instead we consider the estimates using the data for the entire period, it appears
that there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis (2.27) for six of fourteen natural
resource markets. As reported in Table II.IV of the Appendix II.9, this result remains
unchanged if we impose that the demand for the resource decreases over time and that
the stock effect (b) be close to zero.
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2.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to test whether an equilibrium under which the
rates of extraction of nonrenewable resources are linear in the stock of the resource is
consistent with observed data. To do this, iso-elastic time-varying demand and cost func-
tions have been assumed. With such demand and cost functions, an equilibrium characte-
rized by a linear relation between the rate of extraction of the resource and its remaining
stock will exist if and only if the discount rate and the parameters of the problem toge-
ther satisfy a specific testable condition. Panel data for fourteen nonrenewable resources
were used to test statistically whether this condition can be viewed as empirically va-
lid. It appears that if the possibility of structural breaks in the data are ignored, the null
hypothesis that the condition holds cannot be rejected for six of the fourteen resources
being considered. The data shows however that, for each resource, the market price is
characterized by a sub-period where price is increasing and one where it is decreasing. If
the possibility of a structural break is allowed for each resource at the date at which price
goes from increasing to decreasing, then it appears that the null hypothesis is rejected
for all resources. This could be taken to suggest that in future research it would be more
appropriate to consider a model in which the proportion of the stock being extracted each
period is allowed to vary smoothly over time.
CHAPITRE 3
PRICING OF DURABLE EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES UNDER
STOCHASTIC INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Abstract
We take a capital asset pricing approach to the determination of the price of a nonrene-
wable natural resource in the case where the resource is durable, in the sense that once
extracted it becomes a productive asset held above ground. The portfolio choice is then
made up of the following assets : a stock of nonrenewable resource held in the ground
that yields no dividend, a stock of resources held above ground that yields a dividend
in the form of a flow of productive services, and a stock of composite good that can be
held either in the form of productive capital or of a bond whose return is given. There is
a stochastic element to the rate of change of productivity in both the production of the
composite good and in the extraction of the resource. It is shown that the resulting pre-
diction for the price path of the resource differs considerably from the one that follows
from the more basic Hotelling model and that no unambiguous prediction can be drawn
analytically about the pattern of behavior of that price path.
3.1 Introduction
The basic Hotelling model of the exploitation of a nonrenewable natural resource
(Hotelling, 1931) predicts that the in situ price of the resource (its flow price minus the
marginal cost of extracting it, often called the Hotelling rent) will, in equilibrium, grow at
the rate of interest. This means that the rate of growth of the flow price will be a weighted
average of the rate of interest and the rate of change of the cost of extraction, with the
weights being respectively the share of rent and of cost in the price. Therefore, although
the price may at first decline if the cost of extraction is decreasing, it must eventually
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follow an increasing path since the share of rent in the price is increasing with time and
that of cost is decreasing. This basic model, known as the Hotelling rule, has been the
source of much theoretical insights into the behavior of natural resource markets. There
is however very little evidence that resource prices do indeed behave as predicted. 1 This
should not be too surprising, since this parsimonious basic model neglects a number
of important factors which will also play a role in determining the real world behavior
of resource prices. 2 Among those factors are uncertainty about future prospects and the
fact that many nonrenewable natural resources are durable, contrary to what is most often
assumed in theoretical modeling. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact on
the equilibrium pricing of natural resources of simultaneously taking into account those
two factors.
There is an extensive literature on the presence of uncertainty in various forms in
natural resource markets. 3 This paper follows closely the modeling of stochastic future
prospects proposed in Gaudet and Khadr (1991), which studied the case of non durable
natural resources. What distinguishes Gaudet and Khadr (1991) from the previous lite-
rature is that it takes an intertemporal asset pricing approach to the problem. Thus the
Hotelling rule is interpreted as an equilibrium asset pricing condition, the asset being
of course the stock of the resource held in the ground. This asset, contrary to a repro-
ducible asset such as conventional physical capital, has the particularity that it cannot
be increased, with the result that disinvestment decisions are irreversible. The question
then becomes : what is the appropriate rate of return on holding a unit of the resource
in the ground. In the basic deterministic framework assumed by Hotelling the answer is
simply the capital gains that can be obtained from holding it in situ. When investment
opportunities are stochastic, it is shown in Gaudet and Khadr (1991) that its equilibrium
expected return will depend also on the degree of risk aversion and on how its return
1. See Slade and Thille (2009) and Livernois (2009) for excellent recent surveys of empirical analyses
of the Hotelling rule.
2. Gaudet (2007) discusses in more details some of those factors.
3. See Gaudet and Khadr (1991) and the references cited therein.
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happens to be correlated with the performance of the economy in terms of consumption.
Nonrenewable resources most often bring to mind fossil fuels, such as petroleum,
natural gas and coal. Although those natural resources are storable, they are not durable,
since they are consumed in a single usage. But many nonrenewable resources, such as
metals, are durable : once extracted they become above ground assets capable of yiel-
ding a continuous flow of services used as input into various production processes. We
are then in presence of two resource assets : a stock held below ground that yields no
flow of services, and a stock held above ground that does. Those assets have the particu-
larity that the one held above ground can only be increased by depleting the one below
ground. Levhari and Pindyck (1981) is the most important reference on the behavior of
markets for durable resources, a topic on which there is surprisingly very little literature
given that many important nonrenewable resources are in fact durable. It considered the
pricing of durable resources in a partial equilibrium context. In this paper we combine
an approach similar to that of Levhari and Pindyck (1981) for modeling the durability
of the resource with the two-goods multi-assets stochastic pricing framework of Gaudet
and Khadr (1991).
The next section will present the model ; it follows closely that of Gaudet and Khadr
(1991), into which we integrate the durability of the resource à la Levhari-Pindyck. We
then characterize in succession the efficient extraction of the resource in Section 3.3 and,
in Section 3.4, the efficient production of a composite good that uses the services of the
above ground stock of the resource as an input and that can be either consumed or accu-
mulated. The efficiency conditions thus derived serve to determine the consumer’s op-
portunity set subject to which he makes his consumption and portfolio decisions, solved
for in Section 3.5. This enables us to characterize in Section 3.6 the expected equilibrium
behavior of both the asset price and the flow price of the resource, and to highlight the
effect of durability on the expected price path as compared to non durable resources, as
well as to a deterministic context. Brief concluding remarks follow in Section 3.7.
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3.2 The model
Consider an economy in which there are two goods : a composite good and a durable
nonrenewable natural resource. The composite good can be either consumed or accu-
mulated. Its accumulated stock is held either in the form of physical capital, the stock
of which at time t is denoted K(t), or in the form of a “bond”, the stock of which is
B(t). This bond is assumed to reproduce itself at the given exogenous and riskless rate
r, which will represent the force of interest in the economy. 4 The accumulated stock
of capital is used as an input both in the production of the composite good and in the
extraction of the nonrenewable resource.
The ultimate stock of the resource available is assumed given and known. The re-
serves left in the ground at time t will be denoted X(t). Being durable, the resource,
once extracted, accumulates above ground in the form of a stock which depreciates at
the constant rate δ ≥ 0. This durable above ground stock, Q(t), yields a flow of services
which enters the production of the composite good along with the services of physical
capital. There are therefore four assets in which the wealth of this economy can be held,
at any given time : bonds, capital, reserves of the natural resource, and the above ground
resource stock. The latter two assets have the particularity that the above ground stock
can only be increased by reducing the in ground reserves. The resource being nonrene-
wable, its reserves cannot be increased and the decision to extract is irreversible. As for
the stock of the composite good, it will be assumed costlessly transferable between its
three uses. For simplicity, the stock of capital will be assumed not to depreciate.
The production process and the extraction process are both assumed to have a sto-
chastic element. More precisely, if y(t) denotes the production of the composite good
4. For notational convenience we will treat r as time-invariant. Doing so does not affect our results. It
will become clear that it can just as well be thought of as an exogenous time path, which could also be
stochastic.
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and x(t) the extraction of the resource, then :
y(t) = F(Ky(t),Q(t),θ1(t)) (3.1)
x(t) = G(Kx(t),θ2(t)), (3.2)
where Ky(t)+Kx(t) = K(t). The state variables θ1(t) and θ2(t) can be viewed as sto-
chastic productivity indices. They will be assumed to evolve exogenously according to
the following Itô processes :
dθi(t)
θi(t)
= µidt+σidZi(t), i = 1,2; ∀t, (3.3)
with dZi(t)= ξi
√
dt, ξi∼N(0,1), cov(dθ1,dθ2)=σ12dt+o(dt) and σ12 =σ1σ2cov(ξ1,ξ2).
The drifts µi and the variance σi could depend on time t and the state variables.
We will assume F1 > 0, F1Q and F1K > 0, where the subscript 1 denotes the par-
tial derivative of F(·) with respect to θ1. We will also assume FK > 0, FQ > 0, FKK < 0,
FQQ < 0, FQK > 0, and limK→0 FK(K,Q) =∞, limQ→0 FK(K,Q) =∞. Under those condi-
tions it will take an infinite time to exhaust the reserves.
As for the extraction process, it will be assumed, for simplicity, to be given by :
G(Kx,θ2) =
Kx
γ(θ2)
. (3.4)
The function γ(θ2) tells us how many units of capital is required to extract a unit of the
resource. Hence the cost of extraction will be rγ(θ2)x(t), r being the opportunity cost of
capital, and γ(θ2)x(t) the quantity of capital in use as input. It is assumed that γ ′(θ2)< 0,
limθ2→0 γ(θ2) = ∞, and limθ2→+∞ γ(θ2) = 0.
The representative consumer derives utility U(c(t)) from consuming the composite
good at the rate c(t). This utility function satisfies U(c)> 0, U ′(c)> 0, U ′′(c)< 0, and
limc→0U ′(c) = ∞. The consumer discounts the utility flows at the constant rate α .
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It will be assumed that all agents in this economy behave as price takers, both in the
goods and in the assets markets. Consumers are assumed to be the owners of the assets
in the economy. In deciding on their consumption and on their portfolio, they transmit
demand prices to the composite good producers and the resource extractors, who take
them as given in making their decisions. Their production and extraction decisions then
enter the determination of the rates of return on the assets, which the consumers take
as given in making their own decisions. These prices and returns are taken to be those
that equilibrate the markets when production, extraction and consumption take place
simultaneously.
In the next two sections we derive necessary efficiency conditions for the extraction
of the resource and for the production of the composite good. These will generate the
rates of return on assets that will enter the wealth constraint to the consumer’s intertem-
poral optimization problem.
3.3 Efficient resource extraction
The typical price-taking resource extraction firm chooses its rate of extraction so as
to maximize the expected present value of the flow of profits over time. Those profits are
measured in monetary units (we will call them “utils”) and are discounted at the constant
rate α . Let p(t) denote the market flow price of a unit of the resource, measured in units
of the composite good, and let q(t) denote the demand price (in utils) of the composite
good. The extraction firm takes those prices as given in making its extraction decision.
We will assume for now that those prices evolve as Itô processes of the same form as the
productivity indices. It will be shown in the Appendix that this is indeed the case of the
equilibrium outcomes for p(t) and q(t). Therefore :
d p(t)
p(t)
= µp(t)dt+σp(t)dZp(t) (3.5)
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dq(t)
q(t)
= µq(t)dt+σq(t)dZq(t), (3.6)
where again dZi(t) = ξi
√
dt and ξi ∼ N(0,si), i = p,q.
The current value function for this problem is :
V (X(t), p(t),q(t),θ2(t)) = max{x(s)|s∈[t,∞)}
Et
∫ ∞
t
e−α(s−t)q(s) [p(s)− rγ(θ2(s))]x(s)ds,
(3.7)
where the maximization is subject to X(t), (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6), as well as to the resource
constraint
dX(t) =−x(t)dt, X(0) = X0.
Notice that since the demand price q(t) is taken to be the marginal utility of consumption
(U ′(c)), and the discount rate α is taken to be that of the representative consumer, this
value function can be interpreted as measuring the present value of the dividend stream
accruing to the representative consumer as the ultimate owner of the reserves (see Duffie,
1988, chap. 25). In maximizing this present value, the extraction firm therefore takes into
account the preferences of the consumer-owner, including his attitude towards risk. 5 It is
therefore as if the resource firm (i.e. the manager) were acting on behalf of the consumer
(i.e. the owner) to maximize the present value of the dividend stream, thus resulting in a
consumption-efficient outcome.
Let Vi denote the derivative with respect to argument i, for i, j = p,q,θ2, and let
∆i = i. Then the Bellman equation associated to this time-autonomous problem is :
αV = max
x
[
q[p− rγ]x−VX x+∑
i
∆iµiVi+
1
2∑i, j
∆i∆ jσiσ jVi j
]
. (3.8)
5. Notice that if consumers were risk neutral, then q(t) would be independent of c(t) and whether the
dividend stream is valued in terms of utils or in terms of the composite good would be irrelevant. That is
not the case however if the consumer is risk averse, as it will be generally assumed here.
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An interior solution for x will satisfy the following necessary condition :
VX = q(p− rγ). (3.9)
Making use of (3.9) in differentiating both sides of (3.8) with respect to X , we get
αVX = −VXX x+∑
i
∆iµiVXi+
1
2∑i, j
∆i∆ jσiσ jVXi j
=
1
dt
Et(dVX), (3.10)
where the second line is obtained using Itô’s lemma, (1/dt)Et(·) being Itô’s differential
operator. From (3.9) and (3.10) we therefore derive the following condition for efficient
extraction of the natural resource :
1
pi
1
dt
Et(dpi) = α, (3.11)
where
pi = q[p− rγ] (3.12)
is the marginal profit, or net price of the resource in the ground (also called the in situ
price, the asset price, or the resource rent). It is expressed in utils, as is condition (3.11).
The condition therefore says that the discounted marginal profit from extraction, expres-
sed in utils, must be constant over time, thus assuring indifference between extracting the
marginal unit of the resource and leaving it in the ground. It can be viewed as a partial
equilibrium stochastic version of Hotelling’s rule.
This partial equilibrium stochastic arbitrage condition is the same as that found by
Gaudet and Khadr (1991) in the case of a non durable resource. The durability property
of the resource will however intervene, since, in the “general” equilibrium, p(t) and q(t)
will depend on Q(t), the above ground stock of the resource which is used as input in
the production of the composite good, to which we now turn.
68
3.4 Efficient production of the composite good
As already noted, the production of the composite good is a function of the services
of capital and the services of the above ground stock of the durable resource. We will
assume that there are no costs of adjustment. The stock of capital will therefore simply
be adjusted instantaneously to its desired level. As for the above ground stock of the
resource, it is adjusted by purchasing the flow x(t) extracted by the resource sector, but
it is subject to depreciation at the rate δ . It therefore evolves over time according to
dQ(t) = [x(t)−δQ(t)]dt. (3.13)
The representative firm producing the composite good acts as a price-taker in choosing
its level of capital, Ky(t), and its rate of investment in the above stock of the resource,
x(t). The associated current value function, expressed in utils, is
Γ(Q(t), p(t),q(t),θ1(t)) =
max
{Ky(s),x(s)|s∈[t,∞)}
Et
∫ ∞
t
e−α(s−t)q(s) [F(Ky(s),Q(s),θ1(s))− rKy(s)− p(s)x(s)]ds,
(3.14)
where the maximization is subject to (3.13), (3.5) and (3.6). For the reasons already
mentioned in the previous section in the case of the resource extraction firm, this re-
presentative firm can be thought of as managing the production of the composite good
on behalf of the consumer-owner so as to maximize the present value of the resulting
dividend stream, hence generating a consumption-efficient outcome.
The Bellman equation associated to this optimization problem is
αΓ= max
Ky,x
[
q[F− rKy− px]+ΓQ(x−δQ)+∑
i
∆iµiΓi+
1
2∑i, j
∆i∆ jσiσ jΓi j
]
, (3.15)
for i, j = p,q,θ1 and ∆i = i. The first-order necessary conditions for the maximization of
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the right-hand side are
FK = r (3.16)
ΓQ = qp. (3.17)
Differentiating both sides of (3.15) with respect to Q, making use of (3.16) and (3.17)
and of Itô’s lemma, we find that :
αΓQ = qFQ−ΓQδ +ΓQQ(x−δQ)+∑
i
µi∆iΓQi+
1
2∑i, j
∆i∆ jσiσ jΓQi j
= qFQ−ΓQδ + 1dt Et(dΓQ). (3.18)
From (3.17) and (3.18) it follows that the optimal holding of the resource stock as input
in the production of the composite good must satisfy
FQ
p
−δ + 1
qp
1
dt
Etd(qp) = α. (3.19)
Recall that qp is the gross market price of the resource expressed in utils. The left-hand
side of this arbitrage condition represents the marginal return at date t from holding
the stock of resource Q(t) above ground : its marginal product, corrected for the rate
of depreciation and for the expected capital gains to be made from holding it. Since the
right-hand side is constant, so must be the left-hand side : the marginal return must be the
same at each date, leaving the owner indifferent between adding another unit to the stock
above ground or leaving it in the ground to be exploited at a future date. This condition
is of course specific to the fact that the resource is durable.
The efficiency conditions derived in this section and the previous one serve to deter-
mine the rates of return on assets that will be used to define the intertemporal stochastic
opportunity set of the consumer. We now turn to the consumer’s optimization problem.
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3.5 The consumer’s consumption and portfolio decisions
Consumers, as owners of the assets in the economy, decide both on how much to
consume at each date and how to allocate their wealth between capital, bonds, in situ
resources, and above ground resources. Those consumption and asset demands serve
to generate the price signals that the producers take into account in making their own
decisions.
Except for the bond, whose instantaneous rate of return r is riskless, the asset returns
can be expected to evolve as a stochastic process of the following form :
dRi(t) = µi(t)dt+σi(t)dZi(t), i = K,X ,Q. (3.20)
As in the case of the prices of the previous two sections, it will be shown in the Appen-
dix that those stochastic processes are indeed compatible with equilibrium. As for the
riskless asset, its return will be denoted
dRB(t) = rdt. (3.21)
We know however that µk = FK and that, from the efficiency condition (3.16) for the
production of the composite good, one of the equilibrium conditions will be FK = r. It
follows that in equilibrium we must have σK = 0. Therefore we may write
dRK(t) = dRB(t) = dR(t) = rdt. (3.22)
In other words, the return on the accumulated stock of the composite good must be the
same at all times in both of its uses.
Denote by λ (t) the asset price of a unit of reserves expressed in terms of the compo-
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site good. The consumers total wealth at time t, W (t), will therefore be given by
W (t) = K(t)+B(t)+λ (t)X(t)+ p(t)Q(t). (3.23)
The first three elements of wealth are the same as in Gaudet and Khadr (1991). Because
of the durability property of the resource, a fourth element now appears, namely Q(t),
which is valued at the gross market price of the resource in term of the composite good,
p(t).
Differentiating (3.23) totally with respect to time we obtain the consumer’s stochastic
wealth constraint,
dW (t) =−c(t)dt+W (t) [ωX(t)dRX(t)+ωQ(t)dRQ(t)+(1−ωX(t)−ωQ(t))dR(t) ] ,
(3.24)
whereωX(t) andωQ(t) are respectively the share of the representative consumer’s wealth
invested in the stock of resource below ground and above ground, and c(t) is consump-
tion.
The representative consumer’s current value function is then
J(W (t),θ1(t),θ2(t)) = max{c(s),ωX (s),ωQ(s)|s∈[t,∞)}
∫ ∞
t
e−α(s−t)U(c(s))ds, (3.25)
where the maximization is subject to (3.24), (3.20), and (3.22), as well as to the state
(W (t),θ1(t),θ2(t)) inherited at date t.
The corresponding Bellman equation is given by
αJ = max
c,ωX ,ωQ
[
U(c)+{W (ωXµX +ωQµQ+(1−ωX −ωQ)r)− c}JW (3.26)
+
1
2∑k,l
ωkωlσklW 2JWW +
1
2∑i ∑l
ωl∆iσliWJWi+∑
i
∆iµiJi+
1
2∑i, j
∆i∆ jσi jJi j
]
,
for i, j = θ1,θ2, l,k = X ,Q, and ∆i = i. Note that σXi = cov(dRX ,dθi) and
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σQi = cov(dRQ,dθi).
The following conditions must hold for an interior solution for c, ωX , and ωQ :
JW =U ′(c) (3.27)
JW (µX − r)+ JWWW
(
ωXσ2X +ωQσXQ
)
+∑
i
∆iσXiJWi = 0 (3.28)
JW (µQ− r)+ JWWW
(
ωQσ2Q+ωXσXQ
)
+∑
i
∆iσQiJWi = 0. (3.29)
Condition (3.27) is the usual envelope condition, while (3.28) and (3.29) jointly relate
the shares ωX and ωQ of the consumer’s wealth held in the risky assets X(t) and Q(t) to
their excess returns over the riskless rate, their variances and covariances.
3.6 Evolution of the asset and the flow prices of the resource
In the case of a non-durable resource, the Hotelling rule is the sole condition that de-
termines the evolution of the in situ value of the resource and, as a result, of the market
flow price of the resource. As shown in Gaudet and Khadr (1991), this intertemporal ar-
bitrage condition can be viewed as an equilibrium asset-pricing condition. In the case of
a durable resource, the Hotelling rule must still hold, but it is not anymore the only assets
market equilibrium condition, since the resource can also be held above ground as a pro-
ductive asset once extracted. Those two equilibrium conditions will now simultaneously
play a role in determining the evolution of the equilibrium resource price.
The two conditions have already been encountered in a partial equilibrium form as
efficiency conditions (3.11) and (3.19). We will now use those two conditions along
with the consumer’s optimality conditions just derived to establish their interpretation as
equilibrium asset-pricing rules. To do this, first differentiate both sides of the Bellman
73
equation (3.26) with respect to W , to get
αJW =
[(
W
(
ωXµX +ωQµQ+(1−ωX −ωQ)r
)− c)JWW (3.30)
+
1
2∑k,l
ωkωlσklW 2JWWW +∑
i
∑
l
ωl∆iσliWJWWi
+ ∑
i
∆iµiJWi+
1
2∑i, j
∆i∆ jσi jJWi j
]
+
[(
ωXµX +ωQµQ+(1−ωX −ωQ)r
)
JW
+ ∑
k,l
ωkωlσklWJWW +∑
i
∑
l
ωl∆iσliJWi
]
,
for i, j = θ1,θ2 ; l,k = X ,Q and ∆i = i. Using Itô’s lemma, we verify that the first three
lines of the right-hand side are simply (1/dt)EtdJW . Condition (3.30) can therefore be
rewritten
αJW =
1
dt
EtdJW
+
[(
ωXµX +ωQµQ+(1−ωX −ωQ)r
)
JW +∑
k,l
ωkωlσklWJWW +∑
i
∑
l
ωl∆iσliJWi
]
=
1
dt
EtdJW
+ rJW
+ ωX JW (µX − r)+ JWWW
(
ω2Xσ
2
X +ωXωQσXQ
)
+∑
i
ωX∆iσXiJWi
+ ωQJW (µQ− r)+ JWWW
(
ω2Qσ
2
Q+ωQωXσXQ
)
+∑
i
ωQ∆iσQiJWi (3.31)
Substituting for the necessary conditions (3.27), (3.28) and (3.29) for an optimal consumption-
portfolio choice, this reduces to
1
U ′
1
dt
EtdU ′ = α− r. (3.32)
Notice next that since q = U ′(c) and λ = p− rγ , (3.11) and (3.19) can be rewritten
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respectively as
1
U ′λ
1
dt
Etd(U ′λ ) = α (3.33)
and
FQ
p
−δ + 1
U ′p
1
dt
Etd(U ′p) = α. (3.34)
Using (3.32) to eliminate α , we find that the asset-pricing equilibrium requires that the
following two conditions be satisfied simultaneously :
1
U ′λ
1
dt
Etd(U ′λ )− 1U ′
1
dt
EtdU ′ = r (3.35)
and
FQ
p
−δ + 1
U ′p
1
dt
Etd(U ′p)− 1U ′
1
dt
EtdU ′ = r. (3.36)
Condition (3.35) is the equilibrium asset-pricing formulation of the stochastic Ho-
telling rule. It is the same as that found in Gaudet and Khadr (1991) for a non durable
resource ; it applies to durable as well as non-durable resources. The left-hand side mea-
sures the expected rate of return on holding the marginal unit of the resource in the
ground : the rate of growth of the value of the marginal unit of in situ resource measured
in utility terms, corrected for the rate of change of the marginal utility of consumption.
This expected rate of return must equal the “rate of interest” r, which is the return that
can be obtained by holding wealth in the form of the composite good instead of in the
form of resources in the ground. Notice that if (and only if) the representative consumer
were risk neutral, so that U ′ was constant, then the condition reduces to simply equating
the expected rate of growth of the in situ price, (1/λ )(1/dt)Et(dλ ), to the rate of inter-
est. But in the case of risk averse consumers, this is not sufficient : account must then be
taken of the rate of change in the marginal utility of consumption. Notice also that even
with a non-linear utility function, if there is no uncertainty in the investment prospects,
then the condition reduces to (dλ/dt)/λ = r, which is the usual formulation of the basic
Hotelling rule in a deterministic context.
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In the case of a durable resource, the Hotelling rule (3.35) is not sufficient to charac-
terize the evolution of the resource price. In that case, condition (3.36), which is specific
to durable resources, must hold simultaneously with the Hotelling rule. The condition
expresses the fact that the return on the stock of the resource accumulated above ground
as a productive asset must, at the margin, be equal to the return that can be obtained by
accumulating the composite good instead, either in the form of capital of bond, which
in equilibrium both yield the rate of return r. Indeed, the left-hand side of (3.36) is the
return on the marginal unit of the resource accumulated above ground : the marginal
product of its services in the production of the composite good, minus the rate of depre-
ciation of the stock, plus the expected rate of change in the resource price valued in utils,
corrected for the rate of change in the marginal utility of consumption.
Notice that since the right-hand sides of (3.35) and (3.36) are the same, both left-
hand sides must be equal : there must, in equilibrium, be indifference between holding
the resource below ground or above ground.
It is useful to rewrite those conditions with the rate of change of the in situ price and
the flow price expressed directly in terms of the composite good rather than in utility
terms. To do this, we first use Itô’s lemma to obtain
1
U ′λ
1
dt
Etd(U ′λ ) =
1
λ
1
dt
Etdλ +
U ′′
U ′
1
dt
Etdc+
1
2
U ′′′
U ′
1
dt
Et(dc)2+
U ′′
U ′λ
1
dt
Et(dλ ,dc)
(3.37)
1
U ′p
1
dt
Etd(U ′p) =
1
p
1
dt
Etd p+
U ′′′
U ′
1
dt
Etdc+
1
2
U ′′′
U ′
1
dt
Et(dc)2+
U ′′
U ′p
1
dt
Et(d p,dc)
(3.38)
1
U ′
1
dt
EtdU ′ =
U ′′
U ′
1
dt
Etdc+
1
2
U ′′′
U ′
1
dt
Et(dc)2. (3.39)
Substituting from (3.37), (3.38) and (3.39) into (3.35) and (3.36), we find that
1
λ
1
dt
Etdλ = r+A(c)σλc (3.40)
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FQ
p
−δ + 1
p
1
dt
Etd p = r+A(c)σpc, (3.41)
where A(c) =−U ′′c/U ′ is the measure of relative risk aversion and
σλc = (1/dt)Et(dλ/λ ,dc/c) and σpc = (1/dt)Et(d p/p,dc/c) are respectively the co-
variances of the rate of growth of consumption with the rate of growth of the in situ price
and the rate of growth of the flow price of the resource (measured in terms of the compo-
site good). Thus the assets market equilibrium requires that the expected rate of change
of the in situ price, which is the expected return on the below ground reserves, X(t),
must be equal to the rate of interest corrected for the consumer’s degree of risk aversion
multiplied by the covariance between the rate of growth of the in situ price and the rate
growth of consumption. Since the above ground resource is durable, it also requires that
the rate of return on its stock, Q(t), be equal to the same rate of interest corrected for the
measure of the consumer’s risk aversion multiplied by the covariance between the rate
of growth of the market flow price and the rate of growth of consumption.
Notice that if U ′′ is negative, as is being assumed, the measure of relative risk aver-
sion is positive, the consumer being risk averse. This means that the second term on the
right-hand side of each equation will take on the sign of the relevant covariance. For
instance, if σλc is positive, so that a high (low) return on holding the resource stocks
in the ground tends to be associated with a high (low) rate of growth in consumption,
then holding reserves in the ground is a relatively risky investment and requires a return
that exceeds the riskless rate r. The same can be said for holding resource stocks above
ground if σpc is positive. On the other hand, if σλc is negative, then holding resources in
the ground constitutes a form of insurance against adverse results concerning the growth
of consumption. The rate of return on those reserves will then be lower than the riskless
rate r. It may in fact be negative if, for any given degree of risk aversion, the covariance
is sufficiently negative, or if, for any given negative covariance, the consumer is suffi-
ciently risk averse. The same can be said of investment in above ground stocks of the
resource when σpc is negative.
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The covariances σpc and σλc are of course related. Indeed, since p= λ + rγ , we will
have
pσpc = λσλc+ rγσγc (3.42)
or, written differently,
σpc =
(
1− rγ
p
)
σλc+
rγ
p
σγc. (3.43)
Hence σpc is the weighted sum of σλc and σγc, with the weights being respectively the
share in the price (p) of the rent (λ ) and of marginal extraction cost (rγ). Thus σpc and
σλc can be of different signs only if σλc and σγc are of different signs. Furthermore,
with positive extraction cost, we will have σpc = σλc if and only if σλc = σγc, and hence
σpc = σγc.
Eliminating A(c) from (3.40) and (3.41) and using (3.42) and the fact that
1
λ
1
dt
Etdλ =
p
λ
1
p
1
dt
Etd p− rγλ
1
γ
1
dt
Etdγ,
we find that
1
p
1
dt
Etd p =
λ
rγ
{(
σpc−σλc
σγc
)
r+
σλc
σγc
(
FQ
p
−δ
)}
+
σpc
σγc
1
γ
1
dt
Etdγ, (3.44)
which is the expression for the expected rate of change of the flow price of the resource. 6
It is interesting to compare this expression for the expected rate of price change to its
6. This expression could also be written as :
1
p
1
dt
Etd p =
(
1− rγ
p
){(
1− σλc
σγc
)
r+
σλc
σγc
(
FQ−δ p
rγ
+
1
γ
1
dt
Etdγ
)}
+
rγ
p
1
γ
1
dt
Etdγ. (3.45)
On this form, we can remark that the long run behaviour of the resource price will depend on three factors :
the interest rate, r ; the productivity per marginal extraction cost of a unit of resource, FQ−δ p/rγ and the
expected marginal extraction cost growth rate 1γ
1
dt Etdγ . It is interesting to compare this expression for the
expected rate of price change to its equivalent for non durable resource reported in 3.47, where the long
run behaviour of the resource price depends only on the interest rate and the consumer risk aversion rate.
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equivalent in the deterministic case, which is
1
p
d p
dt
=
λ
rγ
(
FQ
p
−δ
)
+
1
γ
dγ
dt
. (3.46)
If and only if σpc = σλc = σγc will (3.44) yield a somewhat similar result, with,
however, the important distinction that the deterministic rates of change of price and
of cost being replaced by their expected values, since the uncertainty remains. It is,
however, highly unlikely that all three covariances with consumption will take the exact
same value.
In the general case, the behavior of the expected price path will therefore depend cri-
tically on the relative values of the three covariances and will be highly unpredictable. To
illustrate, suppose that the rate of depreciation of the above ground stock is sufficiently
small so that FQ > δ p, and that the expected rate of growth of cost is negative (through
technological progress). 7 Assume also that σλc > 0, so that the return on holding re-
serves in the ground is positively correlated with the rate of change of consumption,
and that the reverse is true of the rate of change of costs, so that σγc < 0. Note that
the latter assumption implies that positive technological change in resource extraction
tends to occur when the economy is performing well in terms of consumption, since σγc
is negatively related to σ2c. 8 Under those assumptions, it can be seen from (3.42) that
σpc−σλc < 0, so that both terms on the right-hand side of (3.44) are negative and so
is the expected rate of change of the resource. If we assume instead that σλc < 0, so
that holding resources in the ground tends to be viewed as insurance against unfavorable
performances in consumption, and that σ2c < 0 and hence σγc > 0, then the sign of the
first term is ambiguous and so is that of the second term (since σpc may well be nega-
tive). In such a case, the sign of the expected rate of price change cannot be determined
analytically. Analytical indeterminacy will obviously persist if σλc and σγc happen to be
7. Note that the reverse assumption is also plausible if there is an important depletion effect on extrac-
tion cost that dominates any effect of technological progress.
8. In fact, σγc = γ
′
γ θ2σ2c, and γ
′ < 0.
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of the same sign, whether positive or negative.
The expression in (3.44) for the expected rate of price change is also quite different
from the one that arises when the resource is a non durable, analyzed in Gaudet and
Khadr (1991), namely
1
p
1
dt
Etd p =
(
1− rγ
p
)(
r+A(c)σλc
)
+
rγ
p
1
γ
1
dt
Etdγ. (3.47)
In that case the expected price change is simply a weighted average of the rate of interest
adjusted for the risk aversion factor and the rate of change of the cost of extraction,
where the weights are respectively the share of the rent in price and the share of costs in
price. This is to be compared to the well known basic pricing equation that arises from
the Hotelling rule in the deterministic case, namely
1
p
d p
dt
=
(
1− rγ
p
)
r+
rγ
p
1
γ
dγ
dt
(3.48)
Thus, even in the case of a non durable resource, stochasticity in the production
processes has an important impact on the equilibrium behavior of the resource price.
Let us assume the rate of change of the cost of extraction to be negative. Then, in the
deterministic case, the price may be declining at first since the second term may dominate
the first one for low levels of rent, but it must eventually be increasing as the share of
the rent in the price increases and that of cost decreases. Thus the resource price path
will be either continuously increasing or be U-shaped, and therefore will necessarily
end up increasing. Things are different in the stochastic case. Indeed, if σλc is negative,
which means that favorable returns on the in situ resource stock tend to be associated to
unfavorable performances of the economy (as captured by the growth in consumption),
then the return expected from holding the resource stock in the ground will be smaller
than the rate of interest, since holding the resource stock then appears as a form of
insurance against bad prospects for consumption. In fact there is nothing to prevent the
first term from being negative, since r+A(c)σλc may well be negative if A(c)σλc is
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sufficiently large, in which case, if the expected rate of change of extraction cost is also
negative, the expected rate of change in the price will be negative independently of the
share of the rent in the price. As is clear from (3.44), the durability of the resource further
highlights the need to take into account uncertainty when attempting to characterize
empirically the evolution of resource prices.
Note finally that since, by definition, µX =(1/λ )(1/dt)Etdλ and µQ =(FQ/p)−δ+
(1/p)(1/dt)Etd p, respectively the expected rates of return on holding resource stocks
respectively below ground and above ground, then from (3.40) and (3.41) we have that
the expected instantaneous excess returns on holding those assets are written
µX − r = A(c)σλc (3.49)
and
µQ− r = A(c)σpc. (3.50)
Furthermore, if there exists a reference market portfolio (denote it M) with the property
that σMc 6= 0, then we will also have µM− r = A(c)σMc. By substitution into (3.49) and
(3.50) we then get
µX − r = βX
(
µM− r
)
(3.51)
and
µQ− r = βQ
(
µM− r
)
(3.52)
where βi = σic/σMc, i = λ , p are the well known “beta-coefficients”. A positive βi im-
plies that holding the resource in question constitutes a relatively risky investment, whe-
reas the reverse is true if it is negative. Such specifications suggest that an asset pricing
formulation of the nonrenewable resource exploitation problem can offer an interesting
approach to estimating the temporal behavior of resource prices. 9
9. There have been a few attempts, based at least in part on Gaudet and Khadr (1991), at using such
an approach to estimate the Hotelling rule for non durable resources or, if durable, by treating it implicitly
as non durable. See in particular Slade and Thille (1997) and Young and Ryan (1996), and more recently
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3.7 Conclusion
The Hotelling rule is best viewed as an equilibrium condition in the assets market
rather than simply an equilibrium condition in the flow market, as it very often is. Assets
market equilibrium requires that holding a unit of the resource yield no more and no
less than extracting it in order to invest in some other asset, thus irreversibly depleting
the resource stock. Establishing the intertemporal assets market equilibrium in such a
context requires that careful thought be given to what enters the return on holding the
resource stock. As mentioned at the outset, there are a number of real world factors that
make this task more complicated than it appears from the seminal paper of Hotelling,
where the return could only be the capital gains it generates by holding it in the ground.
As was shown in Gaudet and Khadr (1991) for non durable resources, not the least of
those factors is uncertainty about future investment prospects. If in addition the resource
is durable, depleting the in situ resource stock creates an above ground asset which,
contrary to the in situ stock, yields a dividend in the form of productive services. This
paper has shown that caution should be used in drawing analytical predictions about
resource pricing behavior in the context of durable resources and stochastic investment
opportunities. It is certainly too simplistic to imply from the most basic formulation of
the Hotelling rule that the net price of the resource should be growing at the rate of
interest, and it should be no surprise that observed resource prices do not behave in such
a fashion. Our results highlight the importance for empirical studies of resource prices
of taking account uncertainty about future investment prospects, and especially so in the
case of durable resources. Of course, other factors, such as depletion effects on extraction
costs and the structure of the resource markets are also very important in explaining the
departure of the observed price behavior from the simple r% rule.
Kakeu (2010) who makes use of stock market data and financial econometric methods to estimate the beta
coefficient for oil and gas. Empirical studies of resource price behavior that explicitly take into account
the durability of the resource are to our knowledge still nonexistent.
CONCLUSION
Cette thèse a traité de questions liées au prix et au taux d’extraction optimal des
ressources naturelles non-renouvelables dans divers contextes.
Le premier chapitre présente une approche novatrice d’estimation du prix in-situ des
ressources naturelles non-renouvelable à partir du modèle d’Hotelling. Cette approche
offre trois contributions principales. Au lieu d’utiliser les propriétés des séries chronolo-
giques du prix du marché ou une estimation du prix in-situ pour évaluer le modèle d’Ho-
telling, nous combinons les conditions de premier ordre pour l’extraction optimale des
ressources pour estimer une relation du prix du marché qui est cohérente avec le modèle
d’Hotelling. Au lieu d’une approximation économétrique du coût marginal d’extraction,
nous utilisons les données sur le coût moyen d’extraction pour obtenir une approxima-
tion du coût marginal nécessaire pour l’estimation du prix in-situ. Ces deux contribu-
tions peuvent être résumées en trois étapes. Tout d’abord, nous supposons une forme
fonctionnelle pour le coût d’extraction qui montre comment utiliser le coût moyen d’ex-
traction pour obtenir une approximation du coût marginal. Ensuite, nous combinons les
conditions d’équilibre du modèle d’Hotelling pour estimer un prix de marché qui est
cohérent avec ce modèle. Enfin, nous dérivons une estimation du prix in-situ correspon-
dant. L’autre contribution de ce premier article est la technique économétrique utilisée
pour évaluer le modèle d’Hotelling. Nous utilisons la Méthode des Moments Généralisés
avec changement de régime appliquée aux données de panel. Cette technique d’estima-
tion semble robuste pour tenir compte de l’endogénéité des coûts moyens d’extraction et
de l’effet des changements structurels.
La méthodologie est utilisée pour analyser le prix de quatorze ressources non-renou-
velables. Nous trouvons des résultats qui soutiennent fortement l’utilisation du modèle
d’Hotelling comme un cadre d’analyse du comportement des marchés des ressources
naturelles. Il ressort que le modèle d’Hotelling a un bon pouvoir explicatif des prix du
marché observés. En utilisant des points de rupture appropriés pour évaluer la stabilité
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de nos estimations, nous identifions deux régimes : le premier est caractérisé par une
croissance du prix in-situ et le second par une décroissance du prix in-situ. En utili-
sant un modèle à changement de régime pour réconcilier le modèle d’Hotelling avec le
changement structurelle, nous trouvons que celui-ci n’a aucun impact significatif sur le
pouvoir explicatif du modèle. Cependant, cette nouvelle spécification du modèle fournit
des informations utiles sur le comportement des marchés des ressources naturelles. Il ap-
paraît que le taux auquel les agents actualisent le futur est élevé dans le régime où le prix
in-situ croît et faible dans le régime où le prix in-situ décroît. Ceci suggère que les agents
donnent moins de valeur à des flux de trésorerie futurs lorsque leur bénéfice marginal est
croissant et plus lorsque leur bénéfice marginal est décroissant. Par ailleurs, nous trou-
vons que le coût moyen d’extraction est une bonne approximation pour le coût marginal
d’extraction : le coût marginal d’extraction ne semble pas être significativement différent
du coût moyen d’extraction quelque soit le régime. Les estimations du prix in-situ, avec
cohérence temporelle, décroissent ou présentent une forme en U inversé dans le temps
et sont corrélées positivement au prix de marché. Par ailleurs, la différence entre le prix
in-situ estimé sans changement de régime et celui estimé avec changement de régime est
un processus de moyenne nulle.
Dans ce premier chapitre, des résultats encourageants ont été obtenus sur l’évolution
du prix des ressources. Cependant, son cadre d’analyse ne nous permet pas de tirer des
conclusions empiriques sur l’évolution du taux d’extraction optimale. Cette question
est analysée dans le deuxième chapitre, dont le but principal est de tester empiriquement
l’existence d’un équilibre dans lequel le taux d’extraction optimal est linéaire par rapport
au stock de ressource en terre. Pour parvenir à cette fin, nous spécifions des formes
fonctionnelles pour la demande et le coût d’extraction de la ressource. Nous montrons
alors qu’il existe un équilibre dans lequel le taux d’extraction optimale est proportionnel
au stock de ressource en terre si et seulement si le taux d’actualisation et les autres
paramètres du modèle satisfont une relation bien spécifique. En utilisant les données de
panel de quatorze ressources pour tester cette relation, nous trouvons qu’il n’y a pas
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lieu de rejeter l’hypothèse pour seulement six des ressources considérées. Cependant, en
prenant en compte le changement structurelle dans le temps du prix des ressources dans
nos estimations, nous trouvons que cette hypothèse est rejetée pour toutes les ressources.
Ces résultats suggèrent qu’il serait approprié, dans les recherches futures, de considérer
un modèle dans lequel la fraction de la ressource extraite à chaque période varie de
manière continue dans le temps.
Le troisième chapitre caractérise l’évolution du prix des ressources durables et non-
renouvelables dans une économie où les opportunités d’investissement sont stochas-
tiques. Il faut noter que la règle d’Hotelling est mieux appréhendée comme une condition
d’équilibre d’un marché des actifs plutôt que simplement une condition d’équilibre d’un
marché des flux, comme c’est très souvent le cas. L’équilibre du marché des actifs exige
que la détention d’une unité de la ressource ne donne pas plus et pas moins que ce
qu’on obtiendrait si on l’avait extraite et investie dans d’autres actifs, diminuant ainsi de
manière irréversible le stock de ressource en terre. L’établissement de l’équilibre inter-
temporel du marché des actifs dans un tel contexte nécessite que l’on prête attention aux
déterminants du rendement d’une unité du stock de ressource détenue en terre. Tel que
mentionné dans l’introduction, il y a un certain nombre de facteurs du monde réel qui
rendent cette tâche plus compliquée qu’il n’en paraît dans l’article fondateur d’Hotelling
, où le rendement ne peut être que le gain en capital que l’unité du stock de ressource gé-
nère lorsqu’elle est maintenue en terre. Tel que l’a montré Gaudet and Khadr (1991) pour
les ressources non durables, l’un de ces facteurs est l’incertitude quant aux perspectives
d’investissements futurs. Si en plus la ressource est durable, épuiser la ressource in-situ
crée un actif sur le marché qui, contrairement au stock in-situ, génère un dividende sous
la forme de services productifs.
Ce troisième chapitre a montré que l’on devrait faire preuve de beaucoup de pru-
dence lorsqu’on élabore des prédictions analytiques sur le comportement du prix des
ressources dans un contexte où la ressource est durable et les opportunités d’investisse-
ment stochastiques. Il est certainement trop simpliste d’affirmer à partir de la formulation
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la plus élémentaire de la règle d’Hotelling que le prix net de la ressource devrait croître
au taux d’intérêt. Il n’est donc pas surprenant de constater que les prix des ressources
observées ne se comportent pas tel que prédit. Nos résultats soulignent l’importance
pour les études empiriques sur le prix des ressources de prendre en compte l’incertitude
quant aux perspectives d’investissements futurs et tout particulièrement dans le cas des
ressources durables. D’autres facteurs, tels que l’effet de l’épuisement du stock de la
ressource sur les coûts d’extraction ainsi que la structure des marchés peuvent aussi ex-
pliquer l’écart entre le comportement observé du prix des ressources et la règle de r%
d’Hotelling.
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Annexe I
Appendix to Chapter 1
I.1 Summary statistics for price, average cost and extraction rate data
Ores OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU
Price ( 1982-1984 US$ per ton)
n.id. 87 85 58 72 41 33 32
n.obs. 2587 2570 1584 2008 1082 894 745
Mean 130.9 2073.6 1.0∗107 39.0 10.0 36.9 30.6
Std.Dev. 69.6 900.5 4.4∗106 17.0 4.3 21.3 10.9
Min 33.5 1138.8 3.2∗106 19.1 5.0 20.6 13.2
Max 327.7 4482.2 2.6∗107 79.6 21.0 120.7 49.9
Average extraction by country (Million tons)
n.id. 87 85 58 72 41 33 32
n.obs. 2587 2570 1584 2008 1082 894 745
Mean 131.8 2102.9 7.4∗106 39.8 10.5 38.2 14.0
Std.Dev. 71.8 920.7 2.0∗106 17.4 17.4 22.6 4.3
Min 33.4 1138.8 2.2∗106 19.1 5.0 20.6 5.1
Max 327.7 4482.2 1.1∗107 79.6 21.0 120.7 27.0
Extraction rate by country (Million tons)
n.id. 87 85 58 130.90 41 33 32
n.obs. 2587 2570 1584 130.90 1082 894 745
Mean 3.8∗107 7.8∗105 30.1 2.3∗107 4.7∗107 4.1∗106 3.4∗106
Std.Dev. 1.0∗108 3.4∗106 150.0 5.4∗107 1.5∗108 1.0∗107 6.8∗106
Min 307.6 1.2 6.1∗10−4 1275 0.5 4912 96.2
Max 1.37∗109 5.8∗107 2.5∗103 5.7∗108 1.4∗109 9.0∗107 4.3∗107
Ores COP IRO LEA NIC SIL TIN ZIN
Price ( 1982-1984 US$ per ton)
n.id. 63 51 50 48 52 37 52
n.obs. 1437 1305 1184 789 1337 780 1234
Mean 2.0∗103 40.4 697.6 6.2∗103 2.2∗105 9.8∗103 981.8
Std.Dev. 724.6 10.4 282.1 2.2∗103 1.6∗105 5.5∗103 316.6
Min 964.5 24.4 376.9 2.8∗103 9.8∗104 3.1∗103 659.9
Max 3.7∗103 63.90 1.6∗103 1.1∗104 8.8∗105 2.0∗104 2.0∗103
Average extraction by country (Million tons)
n.id. 63 51 50 48 52 37 52
n.obs. 1437 1305 1184 789 1337 780 1234
Mean 1.0∗103 17.2 441.5 4.2∗103 1.6∗105 9.8∗103 747.2
Std.Dev. 353.3 7.7 114.0 1.0∗103 1.0∗105 5.5∗103 184.5
Min 152.0 4.4 220.50 1.9∗103 6.6∗104 3.1∗103 463.0
Max 2.6∗103 48.6 832.1 6.9∗103 4.8∗105 2.0∗104 1.0∗103
Extraction rate by country (Million tons)
n.id. 63 51 50 48 52 37 52
n.obs. 1437 1305 1184 789 1337 780 1234
Mean 1.8∗105 1.9∗107 8.5∗104 4.6∗104 283.0 9.7∗103 1.5∗105
Std.Dev. 4.0∗105 2.1∗107 1.6∗105 8.6∗104 568.7 2.0∗104 3.1∗105
Min 1.9 65.62 99.6 42.0 0.4 0.6 22.6
Max 4.0∗106 1.3∗108 1.4∗106 7.1∗105 4.2∗103 1.9∗105 3.2∗106
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ;PHO, phosphate ;
COP, copper ; BAU, bauxite ; IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ;NIC nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc
Source : Unpublished World Bank data
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I.2 Characterization of λt
From the equation (1.27), we derive :
E(Situit) = E (E(Situit/Sit , pt , pt+1, ...)) = E (SitE(uit/Sit , pt , pt+1, ...)) = 0. (I.1)
Substituting in (I.1) for the error term uit from (1.27), we get :
E(Situit) = E(Sit(λt−λit)) = 0. (I.2)
Using the law of large number, it follows that :
lim
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Sit(λt−λit) = E(Sit(λt−λit)) = 0 (I.3)
Extracting the value of λt from above equation, the expression for the value of a unit
of resource in ground is therefore :
λt =
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 Sitλit
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 Sit
= pt−α
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 SitACit
limn→∞ 1n ∑
n
i=1 Sit
, (I.4)
as stated in (1.28). To obtain the dynamics of λt , extract the expression for λit from
the static equation (1.27) and substitute it into the dynamic equation (1.26). Using the
same approach as above, we get (1.30).
I.3 Newey West HAC estimator of matrix Σ
The asymptotic covariance matrix of the variable W ′it f (yit ;θ0) is given by :
Σ= lim
T→∞
(
Γ(0)+
T−1
∑
j=1
(
Γ( j)+Γ
′
( j)
))
. (I.5)
The Newey-West estimator of this covariance matrix takes the form :
xv
Σ̂NW = Γ̂(0)+
p
∑
j=1
(
1− j
p+1
)(
Γ̂( j)+ Γ̂
′
( j)
)
(I.6)
Γ̂( j) =
1
T
T
∑
t= j+1
ε̂t ε̂t− jW
′
t Wt− j. (I.7)
Note that the optimal cutoff p is given by T 1/4.
I.4 Ledoit-Wolf well conditioned HAC estimator of Σ
Consider the Frobenius norm ||X ||=√(tr (XX ′)/k , X being a k×T matrix whose
associated inner product is 〈X1X2〉 = tr (X1X ′2)/k. The Ledoit-Wolf HAC estimator is
given by :
Σ̂LW =
bˆ2
dˆ2
mˆI+
aˆ2
dˆ2
Σ̂NW , (I.8)
where Σ̂NW is a Newey West HAC estimator of Σ, I is the k× k identity matrix and
the coefficients are given by :
mˆ = 〈Σ̂NW , I〉 (I.9)
dˆ2 = ||Σ̂NW − mˆI|| (I.10)
b¯2 =
1
p
p
∑
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(1− jp+1
)(
Γ̂( j)+ Γ̂
′
( j)
)
− Σ̂NW
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (I.11)
bˆ2 = min
(
b¯2, dˆ2
)
(I.12)
aˆ2 = dˆ2− bˆ2 (I.13)
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I.5 Quasi-Gauss-Newton- Algorithm
Denote by Q(θ) the objective function. Since Q(θ) is twice continuously differen-
tiable for M-estimators, there exists a second-order Taylor expansion :
QT (θ)' QT (θˆ j)+ sT (θˆ j)′(θ − θˆ j)+ 12(θ − θˆ j)
′HT (θˆ j)(θ − θˆ j), (I.14)
where θˆ j is the estimate in the jth round of the iterative procedure to be described in
a moment, and sT and HT are the gradient and the Hessian of the objective function :
sT (θ) =
∂QT (θ)
∂θ ′
; HT (θ) =
∂ 2QT (θ)
∂θ∂θ ′
. (I.15)
The (j+1)-round estimator θˆ( j+1) is the maximizer of the quadratic function on the
right-hand side of (II.10). It is given by :
θˆ j+1 = θˆ j− [HT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j). (I.16)
This iterative procedure is called the Newton-Raphson algorithm. If the objective
function is concave, the algorithm often converges to the global minimum. This algo-
rithm works well if the matrix HT (θˆ( j) is positive definite.
θˆ j+1 = θˆ j +α j[DT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j), θ0 given, (I.17)
where α j is a scalar which is determined at each step to be minimized. QT (θ j +
α j[DT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j)), DT (θˆ j) is a matrix which approximates the Hessian (matrix of se-
cond derivatives of the objective function) near the maximum, but it is constructed so
that it is always positive definite ; sT (θˆ( j)) is the gradient (vector of first derivatives of
the objective function).
For the objective function given in (II.9), an approximation of the Hessian matrix is
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given by :
DT (θˆ j) = 1T G
′(θˆ j)G(θˆ j) (I.18)
and the second term of the quasi-Newton algorithm becomes :
[DT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j) =
[
∑i G′(θˆ j)G(θˆ j)
]−1
G′(θˆ j)g(θˆ j) . (I.19)
I.6 GMM Specification Test
Tableau I.I – Test of the over identification
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
All data
χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
χ2 p.v. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Regime where the price increases
χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 226 148 0.00 362 221 110 337 0.00 0.00 .
χ2 p.v. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.99 .
Regime where the price decreases
χ2 138 0.00 0.00 0.00 121 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χ2 p.v. 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc ; The value between ( ) is the standard deviation.
Table I.I reports results of an implementation of the J-test. Note that the J-test allows
us to assess moment conditions (1.33) and (1.39). It appears that for almost all models
the moment conditions match the data very well for all regimes. Therefore, there is not
evidence against the GMM specification used in this paper.
Annexe II
Appendix to Chapter 2
II.1 Summary statistics for price, average cost and extraction rate data
Ores OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU
Price ( 1982-1984 US$ per ton)
n.id. 87 85 58 72 41 33 32
n.obs. 2587 2570 1584 2008 1082 894 745
Mean 130.9 2073.6 1.0∗107 39.0 10.0 36.9 30.6
Std.Dev. 69.6 900.5 4.4∗106 17.0 4.3 21.3 10.9
Min 33.5 1138.8 3.2∗106 19.1 5.0 20.6 13.2
Max 327.7 4482.2 2.6∗107 79.6 21.0 120.7 49.9
Average extraction by country (Million tons)
n.id. 87 85 58 72 41 33 32
n.obs. 2587 2570 1584 2008 1082 894 745
Mean 131.8 2102.9 7.4∗106 39.8 10.5 38.2 14.0
Std.Dev. 71.8 920.7 2.0∗106 17.4 17.4 22.6 4.3
Min 33.4 1138.8 2.2∗106 19.1 5.0 20.6 5.1
Max 327.7 4482.2 1.1∗107 79.6 21.0 120.7 27.0
Extraction rate by country (Million tons)
n.id. 87 85 58 130.90 41 33 32
n.obs. 2587 2570 1584 130.90 1082 894 745
Mean 3.8∗107 7.8∗105 30.1 2.3∗107 4.7∗107 4.1∗106 3.4∗106
Std.Dev. 1.0∗108 3.4∗106 150.0 5.4∗107 1.5∗108 1.0∗107 6.8∗106
Min 307.6 1.2 6.1∗10−4 1275 0.5 4912 96.2
Max 1.37∗109 5.8∗107 2.5∗103 5.7∗108 1.4∗109 9.0∗107 4.3∗107
Ores COP IRO LEA NIC SIL TIN ZIN
Price ( 1982-1984 US$ per ton)
n.id. 63 51 50 48 52 37 52
n.obs. 1437 1305 1184 789 1337 780 1234
Mean 2.0∗103 40.4 697.6 6.2∗103 2.2∗105 9.8∗103 981.8
Std.Dev. 724.6 10.4 282.1 2.2∗103 1.6∗105 5.5∗103 316.6
Min 964.5 24.4 376.9 2.8∗103 9.8∗104 3.1∗103 659.9
Max 3.7∗103 63.90 1.6∗103 1.1∗104 8.8∗105 2.0∗104 2.0∗103
Average extraction by country (Million tons)
n.id. 63 51 50 48 52 37 52
n.obs. 1437 1305 1184 789 1337 780 1234
Mean 1.0∗103 17.2 441.5 4.2∗103 1.6∗105 9.8∗103 747.2
Std.Dev. 353.3 7.7 114.0 1.0∗103 1.0∗105 5.5∗103 184.5
Min 152.0 4.4 220.50 1.9∗103 6.6∗104 3.1∗103 463.0
Max 2.6∗103 48.6 832.1 6.9∗103 4.8∗105 2.0∗104 1.0∗103
Extraction rate by country (Million tons)
n.id. 63 51 50 48 52 37 52
n.obs. 1437 1305 1184 789 1337 780 1234
Mean 1.8∗105 1.9∗107 8.5∗104 4.6∗104 283.0 9.7∗103 1.5∗105
Std.Dev. 4.0∗105 2.1∗107 1.6∗105 8.6∗104 568.7 2.0∗104 3.1∗105
Min 1.9 65.62 99.6 42.0 0.4 0.6 22.6
Max 4.0∗106 1.3∗108 1.4∗106 7.1∗105 4.2∗103 1.9∗105 3.2∗106
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ;PHO, phosphate ;
COP, copper ; BAU, bauxite ; IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ;NIC nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc
Source : Unpublished World Bank data
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II.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that q = gS with g constant. The inverse demand function is given by p =
θq−η , with θ˙ = aθ . The cost function is given by C(z,q,S) = z−1qαS−b, with z˙= γz. Let
Ψ(z,S) = z−1S−b and φ(q) = q−η . Then, since S˙ = −q, if we differentiate with respect
to time we get
q˙ =−gq; S˙ =−gS; dφ
′
(q)
dt
= ηgφ
′
(q)
p˙ = (ηg+a)θφ ′(q);
dΨ(z,S)
dt
= (−γ+bg)Ψ(z,S).
From the static efficiency condition (2.8) we have that
λ = p−Cq(z,q,S)
= θφ
′
(q)−αqα−1Ψ(z,S). (II.1)
Differentiating (II.1) with respect to time, we get
λ˙ = (ηg+a)θφ
′
(q)−α[(b−α+1)g− γ]qα−1Ψ(z,S). (II.2)
From the dynamic efficiency condition (2.8) we have
λ˙ = δλ −bgqα−1Ψ(z,S). (II.3)
Substituting (II.1) and (II.2) into (II.3) and simplifying, we get the following necessary
condition :
(ηg+a−δ )θφ ′(q)− [α((b−α+1)g− γ−δ )−bg]qα−1Ψ(z,S) = 0.
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This condition is satisfied if δ and g satisfy the following system of two linear equations :
δ = a+ηg (II.4)
α((b−α+1)g− γ−δ )−bg = 0, (II.5)
from which we get that if (and only if) δ = a+ηg with g a constant given by
g =
α(a+ γ)
α(b−η−α+1)−b
then q(t) = gS(t) constitutes an equilibrium.
The second derivative of Hamiltonian with respect to the stock S, evaluated at q∗ =
gS, is
Hss(t,q∗,S,λ ) =−η(1−η)g1−ηS−η−1θ − (α−b)(α−b−1)gαSα−2Ψ(z,S),
which is negative, thus guaranteing sufficiency.
II.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The Hamiltonian at t is given by.
H = pq−C(z,q,S)−λq
= pq−qαΨ(z,S)− (p−Cq)q
= −qαΨ(z,S)+αqα−1Ψ(z,S))q
= −(1−α)qαΨ(z,S).
Differentiating with respect to time, we get that
H˙ = (−αg− γ+bg)H,
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and it follows that
H(t,q(t),S(t),λ (t)) = H(0,q(0),S(0),λ (0))e(−γ+g(b−α))t
If there is extraction at time 0, then H(0,q(0),S(0),λ (0)) > 0 and there will be
extraction at all dates, so that
H(t,q(t),S(t),λ (t))> 0 ∀t. (II.6)
As a consequence, the stock of resource will be fully depleted. Therefore, at the terminal
date T, S(T ) = 0. In other words, it is not optimal to leave any stock in the ground.
Since S(T ) = 0, the cumulative extraction will be equal to the initial resource en-
dowment at T, namely ∫ T
0
q(τ)dτ = S(0). (II.7)
Substituting the extraction rate q(τ) = q(0)e−gτ into the resource constraint (II.7), we
obtain that
S(0) =
q(0)
g
(1− e−gT )
= S(0)(1− e−gT ). (II.8)
It follows from (II.8) that
e−gT = 0
and thus T = ∞, as stated.
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II.4 Newey West HAC estimator of matrix Σ
The asymptotic covariance matrix of the variable W ′it f (yit ;θ0) is given by
Σ= lim
T→∞
(
Γ(0)+
T−1
∑
j=1
(
Γ( j)+Γ
′
( j)
))
,
where f (yit ;θ0) is the zero function defined in (2.24).
The Newey-West estimator of this covariance matrix takes the form :
Σ̂NW = Γ̂(0)+
p
∑
j=1
(
1− j
p+1
)(
Γ̂( j)+ Γ̂
′
( j)
)
Γ̂( j) =
1
2T
2T
∑
t= j+1
ε̂t ε̂t− jW
′
t Wt− j.
Note that the optimal cutoff p is given by 2T 1/4.
II.5 Ledoit-Wolf well conditioned HAC estimator of Σ
Consider the Frobenius norm ||X ||=√(tr (XX ′)/k , X being a k×T matrix whose
associated inner product is 〈X1X2〉 = tr (X1X ′2)/k. The Ledoit-Wolf HAC estimator is
given by
Σ̂LW =
bˆ2
dˆ2
mˆI+
aˆ2
dˆ2
Σ̂NW ,
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where Σ̂NW is a Newey West HAC estimator of Σ, I is the k× k identity matrix and the
coefficients are given by
mˆ = 〈Σ̂NW , I〉
dˆ2 = ||Σ̂NW − mˆI||
b¯2 =
1
p
p
∑
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(1− jp+1
)(
Γ̂( j)+ Γ̂
′
( j)
)
− Σ̂NW
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
bˆ2 = min
(
b¯2, dˆ2
)
aˆ2 = dˆ2− bˆ2.
II.6 The GMM estimator
Let gT (y;θ) = 1T ∑
T
t=0W
′
it f (yit ;θ) and G(y;θ) = ∂g(y;θ)/∂θ . Then the GMM esti-
mator θˆ is the value of θ which minimizes the following criterion function :
QT (θ) = gT (y,θ)′Σ−1gT (y,θ) (II.9)
where Σ is the optimal covariance matrix of the moment variable W ′it f (yit ,θ), Σ =
W ′ΩW . It can be shown that an estimate of the optimal covariance matrix of θˆ is gi-
ven by :
V̂ar(θˆ) = T−1
[
G(y; θˆ)′Σˆ−1G(y; θˆ)
]−1
,
where Σˆ is a HAC estimator of the covariance matrix Σ=W ′ΩW .
II.7 Quasi-Gauss-Newton Algorithm
Denote by Q(θ) the objective function. Since Q(θ) is twice continuously differen-
tiable for M-estimators, there exists a second-order Taylor expansion
QT (θ)' QT (θˆ j)+ sT (θˆ j)′(θ − θˆ j)+ 12(θ − θˆ j)
′HT (θˆ j)(θ − θˆ j), (II.10)
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where θˆ j is the estimate in the jth round of the iterative procedure to be described in
a moment, and sT and HT are the gradient and the Hessian of the objective function,
namely
sT (θ) =
∂QT (θ)
∂θ ′
; HT (θ) =
∂ 2QT (θ)
∂θ∂θ ′
.
The (j+1)-round estimator θˆ( j+1) is the maximizer of the quadratic function on the
right-hand side of (II.10). It is given by
θˆ j+1 = θˆ j− [HT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j).
This iterative procedure is called the Newton-Raphson algorithm. If the objective
function is concave, the algorithm often converges to the global minimum. This algo-
rithm works well if the matrix HT (θˆ( j) is positive definite. We have
θˆ j+1 = θˆ j +α j[DT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j), θ0 given,
where α j is a scalar which is determined at each step to be minimized,
QT (θ j +α j[DT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j)). DT (θˆ j) is a matrix which approximates the Hessian (ma-
trix of second derivatives of the objective function) near the maximum, but it is construc-
ted so that it is always positive definite ; sT (θˆ( j)) is the gradient (vector of first deriva-
tives of the objective function).
For the objective function given in (II.9), an approximation of the Hessian matrix is
given by
DT (θˆ j) = 1T G
′(θˆ j)G(θˆ j)
and the second term of the quasi-Newton algorithm becomes
[DT (θˆ j]−1sT (θˆ j) =
[
∑i G′(θˆ j)G(θˆ j)
]−1
G′(θˆ j)g(θˆ j). .
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II.8 GMM Specification Test
Tableau II.I – Test of the over identification
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
All data
χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
χ2 p.v. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Regime where the price increases
χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 226 148 0.00 362 221 110 337 0.00 0.00 .
χ2 p.v. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.99 .
Regime where the price decreases
χ2 138 0.00 0.00 0.00 121 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χ2 p.v. 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc ; The value between ( ) is the standard deviation.
Table II.I reports results of an implementation of the J-test. Note that the J-test al-
lows us to assess the moment conditions (2.25). It appears that for almost all resources
the moment conditions match the data very well for all regimes. Therefore, there is no
evidence against the GMM specification used in this paper.
II.9 Estimations under the constraint that demand decreases over time
The results presented in this paper are obtained under the constraints (i) α < b, (ii)
−γ ≤ a and (iii) η ≤ α−1(α−1)(b−α) of Proposition 1. Those constraints come from
the fact that that the demand for the resource is assumed not to always decreases over
time. From the estimations reported in Table 2.II, it appears that demand does decrease
over time for almost all resources. Therefore, it may be acceptable to impose that the
demand for the nonrenewable natural resource decreases at equilibrium. Following this
observation, if I allow the parameter b to be close to zero, then it appears that the condi-
tion a≤−γ is sufficient to obtain a positive value for g. This sufficiency comes from the
fact that the non constrained value of b is smaller than the value of the extraction cost
elasticity α . In order words, under the condition a≤−γ , estimates of the parameters of
the model satisfy b≤α , η ≥ 0 and α−1(α−1)(b−α)≤ 0. Hence the addition constraint
η ≥ α−1(α−1)(b−α) for a positive extraction growth rate is satisfied automatically.
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The results of the reestimation under this different specification of the parameter
constraints (a ≤ −γ and b ≥ 0) are presented in Table II.IV. The conclusions as to the
existence of linear equilibria do not differ from those that can be drawn from the original
estimation results reported in Table 2.IV.
Tableau II.II – Estimation results
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
Sub-period where the price is increasing
α 1.01 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 2.22 1.05 1.13 .
b 0.97 6.76 0.59 8.30 0.51 2.92 1.29 0.40 0.00 8.38 0.33 7.36 2.82 .
γ 0.04 0.16 6.54 0.10 0.58 0.79 0.10 2.48 2.11 2.37 0.22 2.04 5.12 .
δ 0.12 0.21 1.30 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.00 1.17 1.38 .
η 0.73 13.0 19.1 3.64 2.54 7.66 1.03 11.3 4.01 3.70 4.42 3.68 1.95 .
a -0.04 -0.16 -7.91 -0.10 -0.58 -0.79 -0.10 -2.48 -2.24 -2.46 -0.22 -2.41 -6.10 .
Sub-period where the price is decreasing
α 1.00 1.00 3.03 1.12 1.02 1.08 1.27 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.21 1.61 1.09 1.00
b 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.73 1.32 7.43 4.85 2.94 1.88 3.29 3.98 0.54 2.29 0.21
γ 0.09 0.00 0.00 3.07 0.25 1.50 0.25 0.06 0.13 5.74 1.18 0.00 2.36 0.59
δ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.59 0.27 0.00 0.13 0.00
η 2.89 1.58 1.48 1.28 2.40 3.80 9.48 1.08 1.97 1.76 1.82 0.71 2.48 5.73
a -0.09 -0.00 -0.00 -4.70 -0.25 -1.53 -0.32 -0.06 -0.13 -6.21 -1.21 -0.00 -2.37 -0.59
NB : The standard errors of estimated parameters have not be reported because boundary solutions are admissible. OIL, oil ;
NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ; IRO, iron ;
LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
Tableau II.III – Estimates of the parameter g
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
Regime where the price is increasing
g(10−5) 0.13 0.00 714 0.03 90.2 0.01 0.09 0.00 341 261 0.00 100 507 .
Regime where the price is decreasing
g(10−5) 0.34 0.00 0.02 126 21.7 80.4 811 0.38 0.05 266 160 0.08 58.8 0.01
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
Tableau II.IV – Test of the existence of a linear equilibrium
OIL NG GOL HC SC PHO BAU COP IRO LEA NIC SIL ZIN TIN
All data
χ2 128 182 0.00 0.03 507 1.42 91.6 0.09 331 580 0.00 0.00 584 138
χ2 p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.85 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00
Regime where the price increases
χ2 640 397 249 191 249 113 834 598 152 476 124 152 694 .
χ2 p.v. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
Regime where the price decreases
χ2 226 0.00 0.00 105 118 245 273 211 678 142 141 0.13 136 138
χ2 p.v. 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00
There is no evidence against H0 at level 1% ( resp. 5%) when the p.value (p.v) is greater than 0.01 (resp. 0.05)
OIL, oil ; NG, natural gas ; GOL, gold ; HC, hard coal ; SC, brown coal ; PHO, phosphate ; COP’ copper ; BAU, bauxite ;
IRO, iron ; LEA, lead ; NIC, nickel ; SIL, silver ; TIN, tin ; ZIN, zinc.
Annexe III
Appendix to Chapter 3
III.1 Characterization of the equilibrium prices and returns
The demand prices and asset returns have been taken to be those that equilibrate
the markets when extraction, production and consumption take place simultaneously.
They have furthermore been assumed to evolve in equilibrium as stochastic processes,
given that the exogenous productivity indices evolve stochastically. In this Appendix we
show that such assumptions are indeed compatible with the equilibrium and illustrate
how the respective equilibrium drifts and variances can be calculated as functions of the
primitives.
It has already been argued in the last section that we must have in equilibrium
dRK(t) = dRB(t) = rdt. There remains to characterize the prices p(t) and q(t), and the
returns dRX(t) and dRQ(t). Each of those prices and returns will at any given date be
a function of the state of the economy, which is given by the vector (K(t)+B(t), X(t),
Q(t), θ1(t), θ2(t)).
Consider first the utility price of the composite good. It is given by q =U ′(c). If we
replace the decision variable c(t) by its equilibrium value, then q(t) can be expressed as
q(t) = Q(K(t)+B(t),X(t),Q(t),θ1(t),θ2(t)). (III.1)
Similarly, we know from condition (3.17) that q(t)p(t) = ΓQ(Q(t), p(t),q(t),θ1(t)).
Substituting for the utility price q(t) from (III.1), we see that the implicit solution for
p(t) will take the form
p(t) = P(K(t)+B(t),X(t),Q(t),θ1(t),θ2(t)). (III.2)
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As for the asset price (in situ price) of the resource, λ (t), it is given by λ (t) = p(t)−
rγ(θ2), namely the gross market price of a unit or the resource minus the cost of taking
it out of the ground, expressed in terms of the composite good. Hence, substituting for
p(t) from (III.2), the equilibrium value of λ (t) can be written
λ (t) = Λ(K(t)+B(t),X(t),Q(t),θ1(t),θ2(t))
= P(K(t)+B(t),X(t),Q(t),θ1(t),θ2(t))− rγ(θ2(t)). (III.3)
Given that the productivity indices θ1 and θ2 evolve as Itô processes, then, as assu-
med in (3.6), (3.5) and (3.20), so will the equilibrium values of p, q, dRX and dRQ. To
verify this, consider the case of the equilibrium gross price p. Denote by k and b the
instantaneous rates of change of K and B respectively, so that dK = kdt and dB = bdt,
and recall that dX =−xdt and dQ = x−δQ. Then, using Itô’s lemma, we get that
d p = PK+B(k+b)−PX x+PQ(x−δQ)
+ Pθ1dθ1+Pθ2dθ2+Pθ1θ2 +
1
2
Pθ1θ1(dθ1)
2+
1
2
Pθ2θ2(dθ2)
2 (III.4)
Substituting for dθ1 and dθ2 from (3.3), we get
d p
p
=
[
PK+B
P
− PX
P
x+
PQ
P
(x−δQ)+ Pθ1
P
µ1+
Pθ2
P
µ2+
Pθ1θ2
P
σ1σ2ξ1ξ2
+
1
2
(
Pθ1θ1
P
σ21 ξ
2
1 +
Pθ2θ2
P
σ22 ξ
2
2
)]
dt
+
[
Pθ1
P
σ1ξ1+
Pθ2
P
σ2ξ2
]√
dt, (III.5)
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which yields (3.5) as assumed, where
µp =
PK+B
P
− PX
P
x+
PQ
P
(x−δQ)+ Pθ1
P
µ1+
Pθ2
P
µ2+
Pθ1θ2
P
σ1σ2ξ1ξ2
+
1
2
(
Pθ1θ1
P
σ21 ξ
2
1 +
Pθ2θ2
P
σ22 ξ
2
2
)
=
1
P(·)
1
dt
Et(dP(·))
σp =
[Pθ1
P σ1ξ1+
Pθ2
P σ2ξ2
]
ξ2
=
(
1
dt
var
(
dP(·)
P(·)
))¡
and
ξp = ξ2.
Using Itô’s lemma we can derive in the same way µq =(1/Q(·))(1/dt)Et(dQ(·)) and
σq = ((1/dt)varEt(dQ(·)/Q(·))¡, as well as µλ = (1/Λ(·))(1/dt)Et(dΛ(·)) and σλ =
((1/dt)varEt(dΛ(·)/Λ(·))¡. As for the rates of returns on X and on Q, given by
dRX =
dλ
λ
and dRQ =
(
FQ
p
−δ
)
dt+
d p
p
their equilibrium drifts, µX and µQ, and volatility, σX and σQ, can be obtained using the
above, hence verifying the appropriateness of the assumption made in (3.20).
